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JAGDEEP KAUR UDHAM SINGH v. HALAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION BHD
INDUSTRIAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
NUR FAUZAH DATO MOKHTAR
AWARD NO. 980 OF 2025 [CASE NO: 11-4-2879-21]
19 JUNE 2025

An employer's unilateral transfer of an employee to a new position for which the employee lacks the necessary experience, skills, or job description, especially without prior discussion, constitutes a fundamental breach of the employment contract, including the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. Such a breach amounts to constructive dismissal, provided the employee leaves employment in response to the breach and without undue delay.

PP v. SYED SADDIQ SYED ABDUL RAHMAN
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ABU BAKAR JAIS PCA
CHE MOHD RUZIMA GHAZALI FCJ
COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH FCJ
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS: 05(LB)-102-06-2025(W), 05(LB)-103-06-2025(W) & 05(LB)-104-06-2025(W)]
13 JULY 2026

(i) A procedural bank withdrawal cannot be equated to an 'expenditure'. Expanding the constitutional/contractual definition of 'expenses', to include a mere 'withdrawal', rewrites the language of the governing instrument without legal basis. Consequently, a failure to obtain prior approval for a bank withdrawal does not, by itself, satisfy the elements or constitute an act of criminal breach of trust; (ii) An accused cannot be convicted of abetment, under s. 109 of the Penal Code ('PC'), if the act of the alleged principal offender is not proven to be criminally wrong or unlawful in the first place. Where the prosecution fails to establish that the primary actor committed the underlying offence, the charge of abetment against the secondary actor must fail; (iii) Funds donated or raised specifically for a designated candidate's political campaign transfer beneficial ownership to that candidate upon collection. Because the candidate is the beneficial owner of those funds, transferring or utilising them for that campaign does not constitute dishonest misappropriation of third-party property, even if held or transited through an intermediary's account; (iv) Where the predicate offence under s. 403 of the PC fails due to a lack of proof of unlawful origin or criminal property, the consequential money laundering charges under s. 4(1)(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 cannot stand, as the funds transferred do not constitute 'proceeds of unlawful activities'.

PHANG LI KOON v. PP
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
AZMAN ABDULLAH JCA
NOORIN BADARUDDIN JCA
MOHD RADZI ABDUL HAMID JCA
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS: P-05-221-05-2024 & P-05-223-05-2024]
24 JUNE 2026

(i) The constitutional protection against double jeopardy and the statutory plea of autrefois acquit, enshrined in art. 7(2) of the Federal Constitution and s. 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code, do not create a blanket immunity against subsequent prosecutions merely because the new charges stem from the same historical investigation or a broadly related factual background. The prohibition applies strictly to a second prosecution for the same offence; (ii) For the doctrine of issue estoppel to apply in a criminal matter, the precise factual or legal issue raised in the subsequent proceeding must have been distinctly raised, adjudicated, and necessarily determined by the trial court in the earlier proceeding. A discharge and acquittal resulting purely from the prosecution's withdrawal of charges prior to the close of its case, without any judicial adjudication or findings on the specific factual allegations of the subsequent charges, does not satisfy this requirement. Consequently, neither issue estoppel nor res judicata can operate to bar the fresh charges in the absence of a prior determination of those specific issues.

PP v. ONG SU PING SERENE
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
ADLIN ABDUL MAJID J
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: BA-42LB-2-08-2024]
14 MAY 2026

(i) Section 173(h)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code ('CPC') does not impose an inflexible, mandatory duty on a trial judge to reformulate the prosecution's case when the original charge fails. While the court retains discretion to amend a charge to a lesser or alternative offence if a prima facie case is made out, the primary responsibility for framing and pursuing the appropriate charge rests firmly with the prosecution; (ii) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, an appellate court acting under s. 316(a) of the CPC does not possess the power to amend a charge at the appellate stage. The power to alter a finding of a lower court is strictly reserved for appeals against a conviction or sentence; for appeals against an acquittal, the court is limited to reversing the order, directing further inquiry, ordering a retrial or finding the accused guilty on the existing framework according to law.

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PP v. JULASIRI AKILMARA
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
RHODZARIAH BUJANG FCJ
NORDIN HASSAN FCJ
AZMI ARIFFIN FCJ
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 05(L)-77-05-2025(S)]
30 JULY 2026
[2026] CLJ JT (15)

Abstract – At the close of the prosecution's case, there is no statutory or legal requirement for a trial judge to make a formal or spoken declaration specifying whether the accused is called upon to answer a case of actual trafficking or presumed trafficking under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA'). An omission by the trial judge to expressly state or record whether a case of direct or presumed trafficking has been established does not render the order calling for the defence defective nor does it cause a miscarriage of justice, provided that: (i) the prosecution's reliance on actual possession to trigger the statutory presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the DDA is clearly communicated and understood by all parties throughout the proceedings; and (ii) no prejudice was occasioned to the accused in framing or presenting their defence.

CRIMINAL LAW: Offences – Trafficking in dangerous drugs – Presumption of trafficking – Duty of trial judge at close of prosecution's case – Trial judge omitted to state whether accused called upon to answer direct or presumed trafficking – Whether statutory or legal requirement under Criminal Procedure Code to make formal declaration – Whether omission fatal or caused miscarriage of justice – Whether accused fully aware of prosecution's case throughout proceedings – Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 39B(1)(a) & 37(da)(xvi)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Prima facie – Call for defence – Accused charged for trafficking in dangerous drugs – Presumption of trafficking – Duty of trial court at close of prosecution's case – Trial judge omitted to state whether accused called upon to answer direct or presumed trafficking – Whether statutory or legal requirement to make formal declaration – Whether omission fatal or caused miscarriage of justice – Whether accused fully aware of prosecution's case throughout proceedings – Criminal Procedure Code, s. 180

LATEST FC/CA

Mohamad Syaiffulrizam Busu v. PP [2026] CLJU 3131 [CA]
Mohamad Amier Amzar Mohamad Aspar lwn. PP [2026] CLJU 3142 [CA]
Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Mara) v. Naguib Mohd Nor [2026] CLJU 3155 [CA]
Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Ketua Polis Negara & Ors [2026] CLJU 3095 [CA]
Koperai Azam Murni Selangor Berhad & Ors v. Koperasi Sagemal Berhad [2026] CLJU 3101 [CA]
PP v. Mohd Nor Khairi Nosoha & Anor & Another Appeal [2026] CLJU 3047 [CA]
Suruhanjaya Persaingan v. Tribunal Rayuan Persaingan & Ors [2026] CLJU 3081 [CA]
Faizul Azwad Abd Jalil lwn. PP & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2026] CLJU 2939 [CA]
PP v. Chai Kong Wee @ Chia Kong Wee & Another Appeal [2026] CLJU 2928 [CA]
Ha How Kok v. PP & Other Appeals [2026] CLJU 2930 [CA]

JUDICIAL QUOTES

“The learned High Court Judge, having found the impugned statements to be defamatory and the defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comments to be inapplicable, proceeded to order Chord, Kay, and Kalysta to render an apology to Stella based on the language and contents proposed by her.”

“It is well-established that the remedies available in an action for defamation are damages (including general and, where appropriate, aggravated or exemplary damages), and in appropriate cases, injunctive relief to restrain further publication. There is, however, no recognised relief under the common law empowering the court to compel a defendant to publish an apology.”

“An apology, by its nature, is an expression of contrition and a matter of volition. To compel a party to apologise would be to require the court to dictate the content of speech, and supervise its adequacy and sincerity, which in our view are matters that lie beyond the proper province of judicial determination.” - Per Ong Chee Kwan JCA in Tan Sing How & Ors v. Ng Ze Xuan [2026] 7 CLJ 348

“With reference to this issue, the SCIT concluded that the definition of an independent director set by Bursa Malaysia was a mere guideline. The High Court disagreed with the SCIT. We agree with the HCJ as the Bursa Malaysia's listing requirements, including Practice Note 13, are issued pursuant to the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 and are binding on all listed companies.”

“Under para. 1.01 of the listing requirements, an “independent director” is defined as “a director who is independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment or the ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer”.

“We are of the view that the very concept of an independent director presupposes that such a director is not an employee. An independent director is appointed to provide independent oversight and advice, not to be subject to the control of management.” - Per Mohd Firuz Jaffril JCA in Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Datuk Oh Chong Peng [2026] 7 CLJ 329

“In the case before this Court, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to play the role of the medical expert. He moved this Court to accept that there is no need for a medical expert witness to testify to the standard of care of a routine circumcision surgery, as he considers the incident “straightforward and uncomplicated”. With due respect, there is only so much recognition of experience that can be afforded to a counsel—even as senior as the plaintiff's counsel—who undoubtedly may have tried numerous cases on medical negligence to be able to converse the language of medical professionals. Be that as it may, extensive trial experience on the subject does not equate to and cannot substitute for first-hand medical knowledge and expertise. The law under s. 45 of the Evidence Act 1950 recognises the opinions of third parties only when they are experts in the relevant science or skill. The opinions of counsel on the subject do not fulfil that requirement to be considered relevant and admissible, as he is not a medical expert under the law.”

“The plaintiff's failure to call any independent medical expert to testify on the acceptable standard of care is not merely a gap in evidence; it triggers a statutory presumption against the plaintiff.” – Per Johan Lee Kien How J in AB (A Minor Suing Through His Litigation Representative Suhaimay Ismail) v. Ilham Fitri Murad & Ors [2026] CLJU 2269

UPDATED
( as of 06 August 2026)

ACT 166
Legal Profession Act 1976
ACT 127
Environmental Quality Act 1974
PU(A) 220/2022
Copyright (Authorized Entity) Order 2022
ACT 133
Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974
ACT 610
Energy Commission Act 2001

REVOKED
(as of 21 July 2026)

PRINCIPAL

ACT 884
Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link Act 2026
ACT 883
Records (Disposal) (Sarawak) Act 1955 (Revised—2026)
ACT 882
Government Procurement Act 2026
ACT 881
International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation Act 2026
ACT 880
Capitation Grant Act 2026

AMENDING

ACT A1793
Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1792
Supplementary Supply (2025) Act 2026
ACT A1791
Passports (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1790
Immigration (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1789
Rukun Tetangga (Amendment) Act 2026

PUA

PU(A) 300/2026
Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) (Amendment) Rules 2026
PU(A) 299/2026
Cross-Border Insolvency (Prescription Of Threshold) Order 2026
PU(A) 298/2026
Food (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2026
PU(A) 297/2026
Securities Commission Malaysia (Amendment Of Schedule 1) Order 2026
PU(A) 296/2026
Loans Guarantee (Bodies Corporate) (Remission Of Tax And Stamp Duty) (Danainfra Nasional Berhad) (No. 2) Order 2026

PUB

PU(B) 316/2026
Appointment Of Date Of Coming Into Operation
PU(B) 315/2026
Designation And Revocation Of Designation Under Paragraph 5(1)(B)
PU(B) 314/2026
Appointment Of Date Of Coming Into Operation
PU(B) 313/2026
Appointment Of Date Of Coming Into Operation
PU(B) 312/2026
Prescription Under Section 6

BILLS, etc.

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'TECHNOLOGY IN THE SINGAPORE JUDICIARY: A CONSIDERED AND DISCIPLINED APPROACH'

SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION⁺
by Justice Aidan Xu*

I. Introduction

1. The Honourable Chief Justice of India, Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts of India, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen.

2. It is indeed a great honour to address this distinguished gathering. India and Singapore share deep institutional and legal bonds. Both our judiciaries are rooted in the common law tradition, and both are now grappling with one of the defining questions of modern judicial administration: how to harness technology in a way that genuinely strengthens justice, while preserving the values of fairness, legitimacy, due process and public trust.

3. If I may say so, it is indeed fitting for the Singapore judiciary to have been invited to speak today. This is the 200th anniversary of the establishment of the court system in Singapore. When the Second Charter of Justice was granted on 27 November 1826,^[1] Singapore was administered from Calcutta, as part of the Bengal Presidency. It remained under the authority of British India until 1867.^[2] The ties between our two countries run deeper than the common law and our occupation by a common colonial power. Singapore's very name is Sanskrit — Singapura, "Lion City", as I understand it from 'simha' and 'pura'. Thus, when I address judges of India, I am conscious that I speak from a jurisdiction whose earliest recorded name and whose foundational legal institutions both trace connections to this subcontinent.

GLOBAL NEWS

ENGLISH TEXT OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PREVAILS UNTIL AGONG SAYS OTHERWISE, PUTRAJAYA TELLS COURTS

The English version of the Federal Constitution is the nation’s authoritative legal document until the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declares otherwise, Putrajaya has asserted in its official defence against a lawsuit seeking to elevate the Bahasa Melayu version.

The government stated that the Agong has not yet prescribed the Bahasa Melayu text as supreme under Article 160B of the constitution, which allows for such a declaration to be made, Free Malaysia Today reported.

It cited two landmark Federal Court rulings in the cases of Indira Gandhi and Loh Siew Hong as binding precedents that have already settled the matter.

“The English version of the constitution is the one that prevails,” the government said in its statement of defence.

FORMER FEDERAL COURT JUDGE NALLINI PATHMANATHAN: LAWYERS SHOULD DO MORE ‘PRO BONO’ WORK SO MORE MALAYSIANS CAN ACCESS JUSTICE

Lawyers should be encouraged to do free legal work to help Malaysians who cannot afford legal fees get access to justice, former Federal Court judge Tan Sri Nallini Pathmanathan said. She highlighted the importance of legal aid for those who face financial challenges in going to the courts. “That’s a hurdle, that’s why legal aid comes in, a lot of lawyers do work pro bono, and all of that should be encouraged greatly,” she said in a recent interview with Malay Mail. In her August 2021 paper titled “Access to Justice in the Time of Covid-19 Pandemic from the Judiciary’s Perspective”, she highlighted how there are certain groups who cannot afford to hire a private lawyer but also do not qualify to receive free legal aid from the government or Malaysian Bar.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS A LIVING DOCUMENT AND CANNOT REMAIN STATIC — HAFIZ HASSAN

The Federal Constitution is a living document. It cannot therefore remain static.

Changes or amendments to the provisions of the Federal Constitution are inevitable, as duly recognised by Federal Court Judge Raja Azlan Shah (as His Highness then was) in the Federal Court case of Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] in the following words:

“[T]he framers of our Constitution prudently realised that future context of things and experience would need a change in the Constitution, and they, accordingly, armed Parliament with ‘power of formal amendment’.

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