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JAGDEEP KAUR UDHAM SINGH v. HALAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION BHD
INDUSTRIAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
NUR FAUZAH DATO MOKHTAR
AWARD NO. 980 OF 2025 [CASE NO: 11-4-2879-21]
19 JUNE 2025

An employer's unilateral transfer of an employee to a new position for which the employee lacks the necessary experience, skills, or job description, especially without prior discussion, constitutes a fundamental breach of the employment contract, including the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. Such a breach amounts to constructive dismissal, provided the employee leaves employment in response to the breach and without undue delay.

ALLIANCE FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION (AFI) v. NAZIRA NASIR
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
SUPANG LIAN JCA
SHAHNAZ SULAIMAN JCA
AMARJEET SINGH SERJIT SINGH JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-04(A)20-01-2025]
13 AUGUST 2026

An international organisation does not enjoy absolute immunity in domestic employment disputes, as the statutory protection under para. 1 of the First Schedule to the International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 ('IOPIA') is strictly functional. Under s. 11(5) of the IOPIA, statutory immunity is structurally bounded by the underlying international agreement, which in this case explicitly granted the organisation the capacity to employ staff and defend itself in legal proceedings. Consequently, protection is restricted to acts that are strictly necessary for fulfilling institutional objectives; routine administrative actions, such as dismissing an employee for misconduct, fall outside this protected matrix as they do not compromise the organisation's operational independence. Furthermore, by executing an employment contract containing an exclusive choice-of-law and jurisdictional clause in favour of Malaysian courts, an international organisation voluntarily relinquishes immunity and cannot subsequently resile from its agreement. While statutory immunity enjoys a presumption of constitutionality over general constitutional rights unless explicitly impugned, it cannot be expanded beyond its functional and contractual boundaries to evade local industrial jurisdiction.

SIMON ADAVIZE MOMOH v. KETUA PENGARAH, JABATAN IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA & ORS
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
JAMHIRAH ALI J
[CIVIL SUIT NO: BA-22NCVC-11-01-2023]
13 AUGUST 2026

Under the proviso to art. 5(4) of the Federal Constitution, the requirement to produce a detained non-citizen before a Magistrate strictly demands the physical presence of the detainee. Presenting case documents or files to a Magistrate without the actual detainee present is a procedural non-compliance that violates the Constitution, thereby invalidating any continued detention order.

PP v. MOHD NAJIB HJ ABD RAZAK
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
COLLIN LAWRENCE SEQUERAH J
[CASE NO.: MTJ (1) WA-45-7-11/2018 & MTJ (1) WA-45-8-11/2018]
15 JUNE 2026

A 'Public Officer' who has complete control of a Government-linked company uses his office or position for gratification and offends s. 23(1) of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Act 2009 when he sanctions the company to invest in dubious financial transactions in which he has or is deemed to have vested interest, and from which monies or gratifications is proved to have flowed into his bank accounts. In addition, his dealings with such gratifications, whether by way of receipt, usage or transfer of such monies, would amount to money laundering if the same is proven to be 'proceeds of an unlawful activity' under s. 4(1)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001. The Criminal law does not take such criminal conduct in light vein, more so when the perpetrator happens to be the nation's Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and the quantum of losses incurred on the Government came to staggering sums of billions of Malaysian Ringgit. Consequently, in imposing sentence the court is inclined, and is indeed duty bound, to not give much weight to such accused's record of public service, and opts instead for a sentence that is not only proportionate but substantively deterrent in effect.

e-Judgment Today

BADAN PEGUAM MALAYSIA & ORS v. NOOR DELLHAN YAHAYA (POLICE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF DANG WANGI POLICE DISTRICT) & ORS
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
CHOO KAH SING JCA
FAIZAH JAMALUDIN JCA
LIM HOCK LENG JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-01(NCVC)(W)-188-04-2025]
21 OCTOBER 2026
[2026] CLJ JT (16)

Abstract – (i) The Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 ('PAA') embraces the right of all citizens to organise assemblies or to participate in assemblies, peacefully and without arms. This right is subject to only the express restrictions in s. 4(1) of the PAA. Section 9(1) of the PAA lays down a procedural requirement. By virtue of the definition of s. 3 of the PAA, a number of persons can effectuate an assembly in a public place as of right. The mere statutory duty of a Local Authority to control, which corresponds to 'regulate', and care, which corresponds to 'maintain', a public place cannot equate to the legal status of an occupier. Such a flawed premise collapses under its own weight when tested against other legislation. Also, a local authority cannot be an occupier within its own geographic municipal boundary or district. Its functions are mainly local governance and management of public services. Hence, the consent of the Local Authority is not a prerequisite for the purposes of s. 9(1) of the PAA. (ii) The elements of the tort, require proof that the public officer either knew he was exceeding his power or was recklessly indifferent to its limits, coupled with either targeted malice or reckless indifference to the probability of causing harm. Poor knowledge or administration of the law by the police authority, no matter how inconsistent, incompetent and erroneous, without more, falls short of the 'outrageous conduct' and 'contumelious disregard' as required to find the tort of misfeasance in public office.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Public officer – Statutory duty – Resolution by Malaysian Bar for peaceful assembly – Notification under sub-s. 9(1) of Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 ('PAA') rejected by police – Whether police could reject notification – Whether sufficient information provided – Whether mere lack of information nullified notification – Whether right to assemble in public place peacefully and without arms substantive constitutional right – Whether right could be extinguished, curtailed or frustrated by trivial or technical non-compliance with procedural requirement – Whether police breached statutory duty – Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, ss. 10(c) & 11

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Fundamental liberty – Freedom of assembly – Resolution by Malaysian Bar for peaceful assembly – Notification under sub-s. 9(1) of Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 ('PAA') rejected by police – Imposition of conditions – Requirement for written permission from Kuala Lumpur City Hall ('DBKL') to use Padang Merbok car park as assembly point – Whether consent of DBKL prerequisite for purposes of s. 9(1) of PAA – Whether Padang Merbok public place – Whether DBKL 'owner' or 'occupier' of Padang Merbok – Whether DBKL only has regulatory and custodian functions over public places – Whether notice validly given – Whether violation of constitutional rights established – Federal Constitution, arts. 5, 9 & 10

TORT: Misfeasance – Misfeasance in public office – Resolution by Malaysian Bar for peaceful assembly – Notification under sub-s. 9(1) of Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 rejected by police – Whether police officers abused power or authority intentionally – Whether recklessly indifferent as to limits of public power or authority – Whether acted with intention of harming participants of assembly with targeted malice – Whether act of police fell short of the 'outrageous conduct' and 'contumelious disregard' required to found tort of misfeasance in public office

LATEST FC/CA

Mohd Azizul Abd Wahab v. Tan Sri Dato' Seri Abdul Hamid Bador & Ors [2026] CLJU 4289 [FC]
Vimal Kumar Sugumaran & Anor v. PP [2026] CLJU 4161 [CA]
Alex Abdullah & Anor v. Malaysia Maritim Enforcement Agency [2026] CLJU 4152 [CA]
Ooi Choong Han v. Glomac Segar Sdn Bhd [2026] CLJU 4137 [CA]
Mohd Razi Mohd Yasim lwn. PP & Rayuan Yang Lain [2026] CLJU 4097 [CA]
Lonpac Insurance Berhad v. Rashytteren Kathirasen & Ors [2026] CLJU 4196 [CA]
Lee Kuah Shyan v. Lee Kuah Woon & Ors [2026] CLJU 4136 [CA]
Badan Peguam Malaysia & Ors v. Noor Dellhan Yahaya & Ors [2026] CLJU 4172 [CA]
Amin Sayuti lwn. PP [2026] CLJU 4046 [CA]
Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Lush Development Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2026] CLJU 4053 [CA]

JUDICIAL QUOTES

“This court is of the view that where an offence falls within s. 388 of the Criminal Procedure Code but is not punishable by death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which may extend to 40 years, the question whether bail ought to be granted remains a matter within the court's discretion which must be exercised judicially and in accordance with established principles. In exercising that discretion, the court is guided by the principles set out in Wee Swee Siang (supra).”

“However, a different statutory principle applies where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which may extend to 40 years. In such cases, the special provision unders. 388 of the Criminal Provision Code governs the grant of bail. Pursuant to that provision, bail ought not to be granted unless the accused is under the age of 16 years, is a woman, or is a sick or infirm person. Even where one of these is satisfied, the grant of bail remains a matter of judicial discretion, to be exercised sparingly and only where exceptional and special reasons are established.” - Per Kuldeep Kumar Jamna Dass JC in PP v. Kwok Kyungryul & Ors [2026] 9 CLJ 949

"The court is acutely mindful of the evidential difficulties inherent in allegations of sexual harassment. Such conduct usually occurs privately, without direct witnesses and may leave the court with competing accounts. The court also recognises that where there is smoke, an employer may be justified in looking for the fire. In the present case, the anonymous complaint, the accounts gathered by the IIC and the materials placed before the company were sufficient to justify a serious investigation and the issuance of disciplinary charges. The company did not act frivolously or without basis in treating the matter seriously. However, the court must not confuse smoke with fire. A reason to investigate is not proof of misconduct. A reasonable basis to charge is not a finding of guilt. An allegation of sexual harassment is grave and an adverse finding carries serious reputational and professional consequences. The applicable standard remains proof on a balance of probabilities, but that standard must be satisfied by cogent and reliable evidence, not by conjecture, suspicion or the mere possibility that the alleged conduct occurred." - Per Pravin Kaur Jessy in Umapagan K Ampikaipakan v. BFM Media Sdn Bhd [2026] 4 ILR 47

“While the word “suit” would, without difficulty, mean a civil proceeding in court, the phrase “from other legal process” (in para 1 of First Schedule to International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992) is ambiguous requiring interpretation. The case of One Amerin settled the interpretation of this phrase. It was held, following the decision in Sundra Rajoo that the words are to be construed by considering the conventional international law purpose behind the immunity, which is to safeguard the independence of international organisations in the performance of their functions. Incidentally, both One Amerin and Sundra Rajoo concern the same international organisation, namely, the Asian International Arbitration Centre or AIAC which had interpreted para. 1 of the First Schedule.

In construing the phrase “from other legal process” in a manner which accords with the Malaysia's international law obligations, criminal proceedings (Sundra Rajoo) and judicial review proceedings (One Amerin) were interpreted to fall within the scope of the words. It follows, a fortiori, that the words must also include the legal process of the Industrial Court, whose awards, carry the same force as a court of law. This interpretation is in line with Malaysia's international law obligations on privileges and immunities in respect of international organisations.” – Per Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh JCA in Alliance For Financial Inclusion (AFI) v. Nazira Nasir [2026] 9 CLJ 837

“Although inter-company loans between or amongst companies with common directors are not, in themselves, prohibited under the Companies Act, such transactions necessarily attract closer scrutiny owing to the inherent risk of conflicts of interest and the potential misuse of corporate funds for collateral purposes. It was, therefore, entirely appropriate for the learned High Court Judge to subject the transfers of a total sum of RM9,397,057.40 from Ga Yee to Encony and Eramas, facilitated by Khor and Chin, to careful examination in order to determine whether those transfers were tainted by fraud or formed part of a conspiracy to injure Ga Yee.”

“The learned High Court Judge further observed that the transfers of money from Ga Yee to Encony and Eramas had lacked the hallmarks of a bona fide commercial loan transaction and were devoid of any commercial substance indicative of a genuine lending arrangement. This, in turn, rendered the transfers inherently questionable. In our judgment, His Lordship was fully justified in reaching that conclusion for the following reasons.”

“Nature of transaction - a genuine loan or advance would be documented with clear terms regarding consideration, purpose, and, most importantly, repayment. The evidence adduced in the present case showed that these essential elements were completely absent.” – Per Evrol Mariette Peters JCA in Eramas Konsortium Sdn Bhd v. Ga Yee Furniture Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2026] 9 CLJ 705

UPDATED
( as of 05 November 2026)

ACT 804
Dental Act 2018
PU(A) 269/2019
Service Tax (Digital Services) Regulations 2019
ACT 777
Companies Act 2016
ACT 333
Road Transport Act 1987
ACT 371
Registration of Pharmacists Act 1951 (Revised 1989)

REVOKED
(as of 22 October 2026)

PU(A) 303/1999
Occupational Safety and Health (Prohibition of Use of Substance) Order 1999
PU(A) 500/2000
Income Tax (Exemption) (No. 53) Order 2000
PU(A) 93/2026
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 12) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 266/2026]
PU(A) 69/2026
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) Order 2026 [Revoked By PU(A) 265/2026]
PU(A) 283/2023
Printing Presses and Publications (Control of Undesirable Publications) (No. 4) Order 2023 [Revoked By PU(A) 264/2026]

PRINCIPAL

ACT 887
Statistics Act 2026
ACT 886
The Titular Superior Of The Institute Of The Marist Brothers Of The Schools (Incorporation) Act 1958 (Revised—2026)
ACT 885
National Trust Fund Act 2026
ACT 884
Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System Link Act 2026
ACT 883
Records (Disposal) (Sarawak) Act 1955 (Revised—2026)

AMENDING

ACT A1801
Competition Commission (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1800
Competition (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1799
Malaysian Communications And Multimedia Commission (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1798
Communications And Multimedia (Amendment) Act 2026
ACT A1797
Witness Protection (Amendment) Act 2026

PUA

PU(A) 388/2026
Customs (Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties) Order 2026
PU(A) 387/2026
National Heritage (Declaration Of National Heritage) (Heritage Object) (No. 3) Order 2026
PU(A) 386/2026
Road Transport (Prohibition Of Use Of Road) (Federal Roads) (No. 7) Order 2026
PU(A) 385/2026
Road Transport (Prohibition Of Use Of Road) (Federal Roads) (Revocation) (No. 4) Order 2026
PU(A) 384/2026
Income Tax (The Principal Hub Incentive Scheme) (Amendment) Rules 2026

PUB

PU(B) 446/2026
Notice To Third Parties
PU(B) 445/2026
Notice Under Subsection 24(1) Return And Statements Of Election Expenses
PU(B) 444/2026
Notice Of Designation Of Site As Heritage Site
PU(B) 443/2026
Special Direction Of The Minister
PU(B) 442/2026
Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing And Proceeds Of Unlawful Activities Act 2001

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'INTEGRITY: THE CATALYST OF AN INDEPENDENT SOUL'(INTEGRITI PEMANGKIN JIWA MERDEKA)

INAUGURAL LECTURE ON THE OCCASION OF THE INAUGURAL LECTURE CEREMONY⁺
by Professor of Practice Tun (Dr) Tengku Maimun binti Tuan Mat*

INTRODUCTION

[1] We find ourselves in the month of August, amid the atmosphere of celebrating the month of independence, which reminds us that the independence of our nation was not born of the dust of war, of strife, or of bloody revolution such as some of our neighbouring countries and other nations of the world have experienced. Our independence was instead achieved through a process of most meticulous negotiation, peaceful, marked by extraordinary give-and-take, and by a very firm consensus among the various races, with the full consent of Their Royal Highnesses the Malay Rulers, together with negotiations with the colonial administration. It was a noble 'social contract', designed with great wisdom to balance the unique realities of our plural society.

[2] I quote the speech of the late Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj when proclaiming the independence of the Federation of Malaya on 31 August 1957:

"Kesusahan lain2 negeri daripada perjuangan itu boleh ber-bangkit huru-hara kucha-kachih ia-lah dengan kerana berputus2 perhubungan di-antara Raja2 negeri itu dengan ra'ayat. Sa-balek-nya Malaya telah pun mendirikan satu sejarah yang belom biasa lagi di-saksikan di-mana Dunia dahulu itu ia-itu Raja2 dengan ra'ayat berpadu satu. Dan juga tuan2 di-dalam perjuangan kita ini pun belom biasa di-lakukan juga di mana2 tempat yang orang2 daripada bangsa Melayu, China, India lain2 semua bersatu padu berjerit dengan satu suara "MERDEKA" dan mengada fahaman yang baik macham kita ini. Jadi ini semua kita shukor kapada Allah Subahanahu Wata'ala ..."^[1]

GLOBAL NEWS

ENGLISH TEXT OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PREVAILS UNTIL AGONG SAYS OTHERWISE, PUTRAJAYA TELLS COURTS

The English version of the Federal Constitution is the nation’s authoritative legal document until the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declares otherwise, Putrajaya has asserted in its official defence against a lawsuit seeking to elevate the Bahasa Melayu version.

The government stated that the Agong has not yet prescribed the Bahasa Melayu text as supreme under Article 160B of the constitution, which allows for such a declaration to be made, Free Malaysia Today reported.

It cited two landmark Federal Court rulings in the cases of Indira Gandhi and Loh Siew Hong as binding precedents that have already settled the matter.

“The English version of the constitution is the one that prevails,” the government said in its statement of defence.

FORMER FEDERAL COURT JUDGE NALLINI PATHMANATHAN: LAWYERS SHOULD DO MORE ‘PRO BONO’ WORK SO MORE MALAYSIANS CAN ACCESS JUSTICE

Lawyers should be encouraged to do free legal work to help Malaysians who cannot afford legal fees get access to justice, former Federal Court judge Tan Sri Nallini Pathmanathan said. She highlighted the importance of legal aid for those who face financial challenges in going to the courts. “That’s a hurdle, that’s why legal aid comes in, a lot of lawyers do work pro bono, and all of that should be encouraged greatly,” she said in a recent interview with Malay Mail. In her August 2021 paper titled “Access to Justice in the Time of Covid-19 Pandemic from the Judiciary’s Perspective”, she highlighted how there are certain groups who cannot afford to hire a private lawyer but also do not qualify to receive free legal aid from the government or Malaysian Bar.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS A LIVING DOCUMENT AND CANNOT REMAIN STATIC — HAFIZ HASSAN

The Federal Constitution is a living document. It cannot therefore remain static.

Changes or amendments to the provisions of the Federal Constitution are inevitable, as duly recognised by Federal Court Judge Raja Azlan Shah (as His Highness then was) in the Federal Court case of Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] in the following words:

“[T]he framers of our Constitution prudently realised that future context of things and experience would need a change in the Constitution, and they, accordingly, armed Parliament with ‘power of formal amendment’.

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