CIVIL PROCEDURE: Pleadings - Defence - Amendment - Amendment of defence in libel action - Application made after completion of preliminaries and pre-trial procedures and after case fixed for hearing - Whether amendment disclosed defence of justification - Whether delay in application justified - Whether purported particulars amounted to facts - Whether proposed plea of justification correct, proper and applicable - Rules of Court 2012, O. 20 r. 5
TORT: Defamation - Libel - Allegation of utterance of defamatory remarks during political speech - Application to amend made after completion of preliminaries and pre-trial procedures and after case fixed for hearing - Whether applicant entitled to present his version of what the words allegedly uttered by him meant
DATO' SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM v. KHAIRY JAMALUDDIN
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
SM KOMATHY SUPPIAH JC
[CIVIL SUIT NO: S2-23-44-2008]
4 NOVEMBER 2013
The present application was filed by the defendant pursuant to O. 20 r. 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 (`ROC') to amend his defence in a libel action against him which was instituted by the plaintiff. The libel action stemmed from the utterance of certain remarks about the plaintiff by the defendant during a political speech. In response to the plaintiff's letter of demand, the defendant admitted uttering the impugned words and filed his defence relying, inter alia, on the defences of justification, qualified privilege and estoppel. All preliminaries and pre-trial procedures had been completed and the case was fixed for hearing. However, the defendant then sought to expand the defence of justification as pleaded therein to include a `lesser/lower defamatory meaning' and a plea of `partial justification'. In opposing the defendant's proposed amendments to the defence, the plaintiff argued that (i) there was a delay in making the application; (ii) the defendant failed to state the meaning he sought to justify in the proposed amendments; (iii) the purported particulars did not amount to facts which supported the allegation that the impugned words were true as required by O. 78 r. 3(2) of the ROC; and (iv) the proposed plea of justification was wrong, improper and inapplicable as the words which the plaintiff complained of referred to one charge and not several charges. On the other hand, the defendant contended that he had a good explanation for the delay and that by virtue of O. 20 r. 5(1) of the ROC, an application to amend the defence could be made at any stage of the proceedings for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. It was further contended that he was entitled in a defamation action to present his version of what the words allegedly uttered by him meant which was different from the meaning that the plaintiff had ascribed to them.
Held (dismissing application with costs):
(1) Although the court would allow amendments up to the twelfth hour to permit the real dispute between the parties to be adjudicated upon, late applications made after a case had been set down for trial, unlike applications made prior to that, would require extreme close scrutiny and strong justification. There are wider considerations in play than mere presence or absence of prejudice. The court must be vigilant in identifying amendments which seek to raise the real question in controversy between the parties from those not made in good faith but made for the purpose of derailing the trial. As the proposed amendments in the present case were ineffectual and immaterial since they did not disclose a defence of justification, there was consequently no basis to allow the application. (paras 27 & 52)
(2) The proposed amended defence did not indicate with any clarity the alternative meaning that the defendant was relying on. Although it was true that in the proposed amended defence, the defendant pleaded that `the impugned words carry lesser/lower defamatory meaning which are as follows:', there was a glaring omission to state explicitly what was the `lesser/lower defamatory meaning' which the defendant sought to justify. The proposed particulars in the defendant's application were manifestly unsatisfactory. (paras 34 & 35)
(3) Order 18 r. 7 of the ROC allows only facts to be pleaded. The proposed particulars which the defendant sought to plead were not statement of facts but were narrative of his views and opinions about the opposition parties. The opposition parties were not parties to these proceedings and therefore, the defendant's argument was unsustainable. (paras 37, 40 & 41)
(4) Based on s. 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 and the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc & Others v. Trelford & Others, the defendant's submission that he was entitled to amend his defence to raise the defence of partial justification even though the statement of claim referred to only one defamatory meaning, was untenable. The present proceedings involved only one charge. Therefore, the plea of partial justification was bound to fail. (paras 45 & 46)
Case(s) referred to:
Alloy Consolidated Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato' Dr Hj Adam Harun [2011] 5 CLJ 705 FC (refd)
Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri Bakar Shah & Anor (W-02-741-2000)(Unreported) (dist)
Elaine Chase v. Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772 (refd)
Gan Boon Kyee v. Yap Hong Sin & Anor [1997] 3 CLJ 822 CA (refd)
HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Macquarie Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2004] 3 CLJ 121 CA (refd)
Jusoh v. Ng Ah Sooi & Anor [1963] 1 LNS 49 HC (refd)
Ketteman v. Hansel Properties Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 38 (refd)
Lee Kuan Yew v. Chin Vui Khen & Anor [1989] 1 LNS 190 HC (refd)
Lucas-Box v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 All ER 177 (refd)
Mirzan Mahathir v. Star Papyrus Sdn Bhd [2000] 5 CLJ 507 HC (refd)
Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc & Others v. Trelford & Others [1986] 2 All ER 84 (foll)
Ponnusamy & Anor v. Nathu Ram [1959] 1 LNS 73 HC (refd)
Prager v. Times Newspaper Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 300 (refd)
Raphael Pura v. Insas Bhd & Anor [2000] 4 CLJ 830 CA (refd)
Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v. Yamaha (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 CLJ 191; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 428 FC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
Defamation Act 1957, s. 8
Evidence Act 1950, s. 43
Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 7, O. 20 r. 5(1), O. 78 r. 3(2)
Defamation Act 1952 [UK], s. 5
Other source(s) referred to:
Gatley on Libel and Slander, 11th edn, p 1029
Counsel:
For the plaintiff - Sulaiman Abdullah (Leela Jesuthasan with him); M/s Faiz & Co
For the defendant - Jeffry John; M/s Shafee & Co
Reported by Najib Tamby
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Penghakiman terus - Permohonan - Sama ada tuntutan plaintif dihalang oleh had masa - Sama ada permulaan sesuatu tuntutan penghakiman hanya boleh dibuat apabila penghakiman itu boleh dikuatkuasakan - Akta Had Masa 1953, s. 6(3) - Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, A. 14
PROSEDUR SIVIL: Had masa - Bila kausa tindakan bermula - Sama ada permulaan sesuatu tuntutan penghakiman hanya boleh dibuat apabila penghakiman itu boleh dikuatkuasakan - Akta Had Masa 1953, s. 6(3)
PERKATAAN & FRASA: "dari tarikh penghakiman itu boleh dikuatkuasakan" - Akta Had Masa 1953, s. 6(3) - Makna - Sama ada permulaan sesuatu tuntutan penghakiman hanya boleh dibuat apabila penghakiman itu boleh dikuatkuasakan
KU AZMAN KU BAHARI lwn. PACIFIC & ORIENT INSURANCE CO BHD [2013] 2 SMC 189 
MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET, ALOR SETAR
MOHD AZHAR HAMZAH MJ
[KES SIVIL NO: 72-197-02-2013]
9 OKTOBER 2013
Tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan adalah berkisar kepada jumlah terhutang sebanyak RM11,840 bagi jumlah kos rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi hasil dari satu rayuan yang difailkan oleh defendan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak rayuan tersebut dengan kos yang ditaksirkan. Tiada sebarang bayaran dibuat oleh defendan bagi kos rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi dan plaintif telah memfailkan satu writ saman bagi menuntut jumlah terhutang tersebut pada 18 Februari 2013. Plaintif memfailkan permohonan untuk penghakiman terus mengikut A. 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Defendan menghujah bahawa tuntutan plaintif atas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang diputuskan pada 16 Januari 2000 adalah dihalang oleh had masa setelah pemfailan kes ini dibuat selepas tempoh 12 tahun mengikut s. 6(3) Akta Had Masa 1953. Sebaliknya, plaintif berhujah bahawa pengiraan tarikh pelaksanaan kos adalah bermula dari tarikh alokatur Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu 8 November 2001 di mana taksiran kepada alokatur dibuat oleh Timbalan Pendaftar bagi kerja-kerja yang dilakukan oleh pihak plaintif.
Diputuskan (membenarkan permohonan plaintif untuk memasukkan penghakiman terus terhadap defendan):
(1) Sama ada sesuatu tuntutan telah dihalang oleh had masa hendaklah ditentukan oleh masa sesuatu penghakiman (judgment) itu dibuat. Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes ini telah membuat penghakiman dengan membenarkan kos namun, tiada jumlah kos ditetapkan pada masa penghakiman dibuat. Oleh yang demikian, penekanan haruslah diberikan kepada s. 6(3) Akta Had Masa 1953 di mana ia menyatakan "dari tarikh penghakiman itu boleh dikuatkuasakan''. Perkataan yang tertera di dalam subseksyen ini menjelaskan bahawa permulaan sesuatu tuntutan penghakiman hanya boleh dibuat apabila sesuatu penghakiman itu boleh dikuatkuasakan oleh pihak-pihak sebelum dihalang oleh had masa. (perenggan 13-16)
(2) Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi yang membenarkan kos tidak boleh dilaksanakan kerana tiada jumlah kos ditetapkan oleh mahkamah. Maka, tempoh bermula dari tarikh penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi sehingga tarikh alokatur tidak boleh diambil kira untuk menentukan tempoh pelaksanaan sesuatu penghakiman. Tempoh 12 tahun yang ditetapkan oleh s. 6(3) adalah bermula dari tarikh 8 November 2001. Oleh yang demikian, tuntutan pihak plaintif terhadap defendan tidak dihalang oleh had masa. (perenggan 17 & 18)
Kes-kes yang dirujuk:
Re Yamaha (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 LNS 76 HC (dibezakan)
Perundangan yang dirujuk:
Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(3)
Rules of Court 2012, O. 14
Kaunsel:
Bagi pihak plaintif - T/n NM Tiong & Co
Bagi pihak defendan - T/n Ajmer Sandhu & Ong
Dilaporkan oleh Suhainah Wahiduddin