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CASE(S) OF THE WEEK

LEGAL PROFESSION: Malaysian Bar - Powers - Abuse of power - Refusal to issue Sijil Annual on ground of failure to submit accountant's report - Whether decision to refuse Sijil Annual mala fide - Advocates and Solicitors (Issue of Sijil Annual) Rules 1978 - Guidelines on application for Sijil Annual - Legal Profession Act 1976, s. 79(1) - Accountant's Report Rules 1990, rr. 4, 4(i) & 6(1) - Doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel - Whether barred plaintiff from filing suit

LEGAL PROFESSION: Practice of law - Application for Sijil Annual - Failure to submit accountant's report - Whether Bar Council could refuse to issue Sijil Annual - Whether accountant's report a mandatory requirement - Whether advocate & solicitor entitled to legitimate expectation that Sijil Annual will be issued - Whether issuance of Sijil Annual without proper accountant's report is contrary to public policy - Advocates and Solicitors (Issue of Sijil Annual) Rules 1978 - Guidelines on application for Sijil Annual - Legal Profession Act 1976, s. 79(1) - Accountant's Report Rules 1990, rr. 4, 4(i) & 6(1) - Doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel - Whether barred plaintiff from filing suit

LEGAL PROFESSION: Practice of law - Application for Sijil Annual - Refusal of Bar Council to issue Sijil Annual - Failure to submit accountant's report - Whether accountant's report a mandatory requirement - Whether advocate & solicitor entitled to legitimate expectation that Sijil Annual will be issued - Whether issuance of Sijil Annual without proper accountant's report is contrary to public policy - Advocates and Solicitors (Issue of Sijil Annual) Rules 1978 - Guidelines on application for Sijil Annual - Legal Profession Act 1976, s. 79(1) - Accountant's Report Rules 1990, rr. 4, 4(i) & 6(1) - Doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel - Whether barred plaintiff from filing suit

TORT: Damages - Breach of statutory duty - Advocate & Solicitor claiming for losses for not being able to practice for six years due to Bar Council's refusal to issue Sijil Annual - Failure to raise and prove damages - Failure to mitigate losses - Failure to plead exemplary and general damages - Whether claim for damages dismissed


DILJIT KAUR PURAN SINGH v. MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
SU GEOK YIAM J
[CIVIL SUIT NO: S7-22-1036-2008]
26 DECEMBER 2013

The plaintiff was an advocate & solicitor practising under the name Diljit & Co. For the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, the plaintiff had applied for and had been issued with the Practising Certificates. For these three years, the plaintiff had complied with the Advocates and Solicitors (Issue of Sijil Annual) Rules 1978 and the Guidelines on Application for Sijil Annual (PU(A) 368/78) issued by the defendant under s. 32(2), (4) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (`the Act'). The defendant, however, subsequently refused to issue the Practising Certificate to the plaintiff for the year 2002 on the grounds that the plaintiff had not delivered an accountant's report. The plaintiff claimed that she had a legitimate expectation that she would be issued with the Practising Certificate if she were to submit her application without delivering an accountant's report as she neither had nor maintained a client's account. The plaintiff, therefore, filed an originating summons (`OS') against the defendant at the High Court seeking an order that the defendant be compelled to issue the Practising Certificate for the year 2002. The High Court dismissed the plaintiff's OS. The plaintiff's appeal to the Court of Appeal against that decision was also struck off on the grounds of the plaintiff's absence in the Court of Appeal for the hearing of the appeal. The plaintiff's motion to reinstate her appeal was also dismissed. The defendant had also refused to issue the plaintiff with Practising Certificates for the years 2002 to 2006 on the same grounds. The plaintiff thus filed the present suit claiming that she had suffered loss and damage because she could not practice as an advocate and solicitor for the years 2002 to 2007.

Held (dismissing plaintiff's claim with no order as to costs):

(1) The doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel barred the plaintiff from filing the present suit in respect of the refusal of the defendant to issue to the plaintiff the Sijil Annual for the year 2002 because the decision of the High Court in the plaintiff's OS had become final and binding on the plaintiff. Further, the defendant was justified in not issuing the Sijil Annual to the plaintiff for the year 2002 because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the condition precedent for the issuance of the Sijil Annual. (para 55)

(2) The defendant's Circular No. 19/2001 expressly required the plaintiff to deliver an accountant's report to the defendant. However, the plaintiff neither delivered an accountant's report to the defendant nor made any application to the defendant to obtain an exemption of that mandatory requirement.
(para 55)

(3) The plaintiff did not submit any application to the defendant for the issuance to her of the Sijil Annual for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. For the year 2006, the plaintiff did submit an application to the defendant for the Sijil Annual but the plaintiff's application was not in order. In relation to the defendant's refusal to issue her Sijil Annual for the years 2002 and 2006, the plaintiff failed to prove mala fide and the lack of bona fides on the part of the defendant. (para 55)

(4) Whether or not the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies depends on the facts of each case and it cannot and should not override the express statutory power vested in an authority or a body; North East Plantations Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun & Anor (refd); North East Plantations Sdn Bhd lwn. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun & Satu Lagi (refd). (para 95)

(5) It would be contrary to public policy to allow the plaintiff to raise the doctrine of legitimate expectation against the defendant as the latter was exercising a statutory power ie, discretion, which was expressly conferred upon it by s. 79(1) of the Act and rr. 4, 4(i) and 6(1) of the Accountant's Report Rules 1990, when the defendant required the plaintiff to deliver an accountant's report for her application for the Sijil Annual for the years 2002 and 2006. (para 96)

(6) The plaintiff failed to prove that it was the defendant who had wrongfully, with mala fides and without bona fide, refused to issue to her the Sijil Annual. It is trite that he who asserts bad faith bears the burden of proving it; Yeap Seok Pen v. Government of the State of Kelantan (refd). (para 111)

(7) No particulars of loss were pleaded in the plaintiff's statement of claim (`SOC') and the same was not raised or established during the course of the full trial. The plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence to prove the loss, if any, suffered or incurred by her. The plaintiff failed to prove the fact of the alleged losses and the amount of the alleged losses suffered by her. (paras 142 & 143)

(8) A plaintiff has a duty to mitigate any loss allegedly suffered or incurred by him/her. On the facts, the plaintiff could not expect to sit idly by folding her arms and wait to be compensated in full by the defendant in the event she succeeded in her action. Further, as the plaintiff had not pleaded in her SOC for exemplary damages and general damages for anxiety, distress and loss of self-esteem, her claim under these heads failed. (paras 147 & 148)

Case(s) referred to:

Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v. Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783 SC (refd)

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd & Ors [1967] 1 AC 853 (refd)

Chan Tuck Seng v. Chan Lee & Ors [2004] 6 CLJ 1 HC (refd)

Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v. Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 1 CLJ 19 HC (refd)

Datuk Ooi Han Eng & Anor v. Soh Huang Siah [2010] 1 LNS 343 CA (refd)

Fauziah Khanom Irshad Ali Khan v. Pegawai Pejabat Pelajaran Daerah Johor Bahru & Ors [2011] 1 LNS 1394 HC (refd)

Goh Keat Poh & Ors v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2012] 10 CLJ 70 CA (refd)

Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ 219; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 63 SC (refd)

Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Hartela Contractors Ltd [1997] 2 CLJ 104 CA (refd)

Hjh Maria @ Maryati bt Dalle (t/a Melati Kontraktor) v. Majlis Perbandaran Tawau [2012] 3 MLJ 132 (refd)

Kasinathar Balendra Thuraisingam v. Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2001] 4 CLJ 160 HC (refd)

Mensa Mercantile (Far East) Pte Ltd v. Eikobina (M) Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 LNS 15 HC (refd)

Muniandy & Anor v. Muhd Abdul Kader Muhd Saheed & Ors [1989] 2 CLJ 577; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 116 SC (refd)

North East Plantations Sdn Bhd lwn. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun & Satu Lagi [2011] 4 CLJ 729 FC (refd)

North East Plantations Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun & Anor [2011] 2 CLJ 392 CA (refd)

Popular Industries Ltd v. The Eastern Garment Manufacturing Co Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 133; [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 635 HC (refd)

Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors v. Smt Deorajin Dobi and another AIR 1960 SC 941 (refd)

Yeap Seok Pen v. Government of the State of Kelantan [1986] 1 LNS 89 PC (refd)

Yip Shou Shan v. Majlis Peguam [1994] 3 CLJ 150 SC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Accountant's Report Rules 1990, rr. 4, 4(i), 6(1), (2), (3)(1), 8

Evidence Act 1950, ss. 62, 64, 65, 101, 102

Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 32(1)(c), (2), (4), 33(2), 34, 41, 42, 47, 79(1), 99

Solicitors' Account Rules 1990, r. 16

Other source(s) referred to:

Black's Law Dictionary, 9th edn, p 1254

Counsel:

For the plaintiff - In Person

For the defendant - Ang Hean Leng (R Rishikessingam with him); M/s Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill

Reported by Amutha Suppayah




CRIMINAL LAW: Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 - Section 9(1) and 9(5) - Failure by organiser of assembly to give police ten days' notice - Restrictions under s. 9(1) - Whether ten days' notice unreasonable restriction on right of citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms - Whether non-compliance by organiser attracted criminal penalty - Whether criminalising breach of restrictions under s. 9(1) unconstitutional

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Penal statutes - Failure by organiser of assembly to give police ten days' notice - Whether s. 9(5) Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (`PAA') unconstitutional - Whether requirement under s. 9(1) of PAA unreasonable restriction on right of citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms - Article 10 Federal Constitution - Whether unconstitutional part of PAA could be severed from rest of Act - Article 4(1) Federal Constitution and doctrine of severability


NIK NAZMI NIK AHMAD v. PP
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
MOHAMAD ARIFF YUSOF JCA, MAH WENG KWAI JCA, HAMID SULTAN ABU BACKER JCA
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: B-09-303-11-2013]
25 APRIL 2014
[2014] CLJ JT(4)

The appellant, an opposition party State Assemblyman, was charged in the Sessions Court for having organised a public assembly at an indoor stadium without having notified the Officer in Charge of the Police District (`OCPD') concerned ten days before the event. The 10-day notice requirement was contained in s. 9(1) of the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (`PAA'), s. 9(5) of which provided that a person who contravened s. 9(1) committed an offence which carried the penalty of a fine not exceeding RM10,000. The appellant had notified the OCPD about the assembly on the very day it was held. The assembly itself was held without any incident. Pursuant to him being charged, the appellant applied to the High Court to declare s. 9(1) and 9(5) of the PAA null and void and unconstitutional, for the charge against him to be struck out and for him to be acquitted and discharged of the charge. The High Court dismissed his application resulting in the instant appeal. The appellant inter alia argued that both s. 9(1) and 9(5) of the PAA should be struck down as being ultra vires the Federal Constitution (`Constitution') because: (i) the requirement for a 10-day notice, for having totally prohibited a spontaneous or immediate assembly, was an unreasonable restriction on the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizens to assemble peaceably; and (ii) even if the restriction under s. 9(1) was reasonable, it was legally and constitutionally wrong to criminalise its breach.

Held (allowing appeal; acquitting and discharging appellant)

Per Mohamad Ariff Yusof JCA:

(1) There was no provision in the PAA which stipulated that an assembly held without the giving of the requisite prior notice was per se unlawful. That which was fundamentally lawful could not, in the same breath, result in an unlawful act on the part of the organiser by reason of an administrative failure or omission. Such a dichotomy was irrational in the legal sense. The effect of holding s. 9(5) valid would be to hold an organiser of an assembly criminally liable although the assembly itself was peaceful or there was full compliance with the terms and conditions imposed. The legislative response was wholly disproportionate to the legislative objectives. (paras 41-43)

(2) Section 9(1), on the other hand, was constitutional. It could not be said that s. 9(1) could not pass constitutional muster as a `reasonable restriction'. It was not the court's domain to stipulate whether the 10-day notice should be shorter or that the law must recognise the rakyat's right to have an immediate assembly to voice out their dissent. Length of notice was a matter ultimately of legislative policy. The courts in testing the constitutionality of legislative action should not substitute their own view on what ought to be the proper policy. The court's domain was to determine the legality of an action judged against proper legal standards, principles and rules. (para 40)

(3) On the facts of the appeal and on the law, s. 9(1) and 9(5) could be severed since both were not incontrovertibly intertwined. Thus, while the giving of prior notice of ten days would still be required, any non-compliance on the part of the organiser would not attract a criminal penalty per se. (paras 44 & 45)

Per Mah Weng Kwai JCA (concurring):

(1) Section 9(5) of the PAA was ultra vires art. 10 of the Constitution for criminalising a breach of the restriction under s. 9(1) and was therefore unconstitutional. The word `restriction' was used several times in the Constitution eg, in arts. 67, 111, 112, 127, 135 and 151 (with regard to powers of government, legislature and Parliament) and also in arts. 9 and 10 with regard to fundamental liberties. But there was nothing in these articles to suggest that the breach of those `restrictions' would give rise to criminal prosecution or sanction. Therefore, a consistent interpretation would be that the word `restrictions' did not imply power to criminalise their breach. (paras 77, 78, & 81)

(2) The inconsistent and incongruous position created by s. 9(1) and 9(5) of the PAA was that whilst a participant in a peaceful assembly held without the 10-day notice committed no wrong, the organiser of the assembly would be criminally liable under s. 9(5) for not having given the 10-day notice. (para 82)

(3) The right to peaceful assembly, which ought to include the right to organise a peaceful assembly, could only be restricted reasonably and not prohibited. To be a `permitted restriction' within the scope of art. 10(2)(b) of the Constitution, it must be reasonable and there must be a rational nexus between the requirement for the 10-day notice and the objective of maintaining public order or security in the Federation or any part thereof. The respondent failed to show how the failure to give the 10-day notice would necessarily result in a threat to national security or public order. The assembly in this case was held in a stadium at night which did not affect daily business life nor disrupt traffic. It was a static assembly and not a street procession or demonstration. (paras 96, 98 & 111)

(4) The restriction imposed by s. 9(1) and 9(5) of the PAA was not reasonable as it amounted to an effective prohibition against urgent and spontaneous assemblies. It would be impossible for an organiser to organise a spontaneous assembly without being under threat of prosecution. There was no provision in the PAA for any exemption even if the need for the assembly was extremely urgent. However, s. 9(1) on its own, without the offence and penalty in s. 9(5), did not have the effect of prohibiting urgent and spontaneous assemblies. Accordingly, s. 9(5) ought to be severed from the notice requirement in s. 9(1) and be struck down for being unconstitutional. (paras 109 & 113)

Per Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA (concurring):

(1) There was no provision at all for those who assembled peacefully and without arms to be charged for any offence under the PAA. If the assembly itself was peaceful, then a penal sanction against the organisers would not qualify for any intended protection as having direct nexus or proximity to art. 10(2) of the Constitution. (para 150)

(2) The PAA gave a right for everyone to assemble whether notice was or was not given. To criminalise for not giving notice and penalising the organiser had no nexus to `public order' or `interest of the security of the Federation' unless the assembly was not peaceful. Section 9(5) failed the `reasonable test' as well as the `proportionality test' as it had no nexus to `public order', `security of the Federation' and/or an assembly which was not peaceful. The burden was on the State to satisfy the court that the imposition of the restrictions was not only in the interest of the security of the Federation or of public order but also satisfied the test of reasonableness and fell within the parameters or framework of art. 10(2) of the Constitution. (paras 141 & 148)

(3) Article 10 does not criminalise the breach of the restriction. It is not permissible to read into art. 10 to say that if there was breach of the restriction there must be penal sanction, more so when the restriction had nothing to do with the assembly per se. Restrictions were procedural and/or administrative in nature. The framers of the Constitution did not provide for penal sanction or enactment of penal sanction for breach of restrictions. The Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and other specific laws had sufficient penal laws to check `law and order', `public order', `security of the Federation', `public tranquillity', etc. (paras 138 & 141)

(4) Taking into consideration the rigid test relating to `reasonable restriction', the 10-day notice period was not excessive or a breach of art. 10(2) as it did not prohibit the public from assembling peacefully and without arms at any time, day or night. The 10-day notice which the organisers had to give had nothing to do with art. 10(2). It would be superfluous to apply the `reasonable restriction' jurisprudence to the organiser even though it may be seen to be an indirect way to discourage peaceful assembly. However, the sting of the 10-day notice would be absent if the penal sanction was removed and the restriction or condition stood similar to conditions stated in s. 6 of the PAA which had no penal sanction. (para 151)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Perayu, seorang ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri bagi parti pembangkang, dituduh di Mahkamah Sesyen kerana menganjurkan perhimpunan aman di dalam stadium tanpa memberikan notis kepada Ketua Polis Daerah (`OCPD') yang berkaitan, sepuluh hari sebelum tarikh perhimpunan diadakan. Keperluan notis 10 hari tersebut terkandung dalam s. 9(1) Akta Perhimpunan Aman 2012 (`APA'), yang mana s. 9(5) memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang yang melanggar s. 9(1) melakukan satu kesalahan yang membawa hukuman denda tidak melebihi RM10,000. Perayu telah memaklumkan kepada OCPD mengenai perhimpunan tersebut pada hari ia diadakan. Perhimpunan itu sendiri berjalan tanpa apa-apa kejadian. Berikutan pertuduhan terhadapnya, perayu memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa s. 9(1) dan 9(5) APA adalah batal dan tidak sah dan tidak berperlembagaan, bahawa pertuduhan terhadapnya dibatalkan dan dia dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonannya sekaligus membangkitkan rayuan ini. Perayu antara lain berhujah bahawa kedua-dua s. 9(1) dan 9(5) APA wajar dibatalkan kerana ultra vires Perlembagaan Persekutuan (`Perlembagaan') atas alasan: (i) keperluan untuk notis sepuluh hari adalah sekatan yang tidak munasabah atas hak warganegara yang dijamin perlembagaan untuk berhimpun secara aman kerana ia menghalang sama sekali perhimpunan secara spontan dan segera; dan (ii) walaupun sekatan dalam s. 9(1) adalah munasabah, ia adalah salah dari segi undang-undang dan perlembagaan untuk menjadikan pelanggarannya sebagai jenayah.

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan; melepaskan dan membebaskan perayu)

Oleh Mohamad Ariff Yusof HMR:

(1) Tidak ada peruntukan dalam APA yang menyatakan bahawa perhimpunan yang diadakan tanpa memberikan notis awal yang diperlukan adalah dengan sendirinya tidak sah. Apa yang pada asasnya adalah sah, tidak boleh, pada masa yang sama, menjadi tindakan tidak sah oleh penganjur disebabkan oleh kegagalan atau ketinggalan pentadbiran. Dikotomi sebegitu adalah tidak rasional dari segi undang-undang. Kesan memutuskan bahawa s. 9(5) sebagai sah adalah memutuskan penganjur perhimpunan bertanggungan secara jenayah walaupun perhimpunan itu sendiri adalah secara aman dan terdapat pematuhan penuh dengan terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang dikenakan. Jawapan perundangan adalah secara keseluruhannya tidak seimbang dengan objektif perundangan.

(2) Sebaliknya, s. 9(1) adalah berperlembagaan. Tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa s. 9(1) tidak boleh melepasi syarat perlembagaan sebagai `sekatan munasabah'. Bukanlah kuasa mahkamah untuk menyatakan sama ada notis sepuluh hari sepatutnya disingkatkan atau bahawa undang-undang mesti mengakui hak rakyat untuk mengadakan perhimpunan segera bagi menyuarakan bantahan mereka. Tempoh notis adalah perkara yang pada asasnya merupakan polisi perundangan. Mahkamah, dalam menguji keperlembagaan tindakan perundangan, tidak boleh menggantikan pendapat mereka sendiri mengenai apa yang sepatutnya menjadi polisi yang wajar. Kuasa mahkamah adalah untuk menentukan kesahan sesuatu tindakan yang dihakimi terhadap standard, prinsip-prinsip dan kaedah-kaedah undang-undang yang sepatutnya.

(3) Atas fakta rayuan dan undang-undang, s. 9(1) dan 9(5) boleh dipecahkan memandangkan kedua-duanya tidak saling berkait. Oleh itu, walaupun memberikan notis awal sepuluh hari adalah masih diperlukan, apa-apa ketidakpatuhan oleh pihak penganjur tidak akan dengan sendirinya mengundang hukuman jenayah.

Oleh Mah Weng Kwai HMR (menyetujui):

(1) Seksyen 9(5) APA adalah ultra vires per. 10 Perlembagaan kerana menjadikan sesuatu pelanggaran sekatan di bawah s. 9(1) sebagai jenayah dan dengan itu tidak berperlembagaan. Perkataan `sekatan' digunakan beberapa kali dalam Perlembagaan misalnya, dalam per. 67, 111, 112, 127, 135 dan 151 (berkaitan dengan kuasa-kuasa kerajaan, perundangan dan Parlimen) dan juga dalam per. 9 dan 10 berkaitan dengan kebebasan asasi. Tetapi tidak ada apa-apa dalam perkara-perkara tersebut yang menyarankan bahawa pelanggaran `sekatan-sekatan' tersebut akan membingkas pendakwaan atau hukuman jenayah. Oleh itu, tafsiran yang konsisten adalah bahawa perkataan `sekatan-sekatan' tidak bermaksud kuasa untuk menjadikan pelanggaran tersebut sebagai jenayah.

(2) Kedudukan yang tidak konsisten dan tidak selari yang diwujudkan oleh s. 9(1) dan 9(5) APA adalah bahawa sementara seseorang ahli perhimpunan aman yang diadakan tanpa notis sepuluh hari tidak melakukan apa-apa kesalahan, penganjur perhimpunan akan bertanggungan dari segi jenayah di bawah s. 9(5) kerana tidak memberikan notis sepuluh hari.

(3) Hak untuk perhimpunan aman yang sepatutnya termasuk hak untuk menganjurkan perhimpunan aman, hanya boleh disekat secara munasabah dan bukan dilarang. Untuk menjadi `sekatan yang dibenarkan' dalam skop per. 10(2)(b) Perlembagaan, ia mestilah munasabah dan perlu ada kaitan yang munasabah di antara keperluan bagi notis sepuluh hari dan objektif untuk mengekalkan ketenteraman awam atau keselamatan dalam Persekutuan atau mana-mana bahagiannya. Responden gagal menunjukkan bagaimana kegagalan memberikan notis sepuluh hari akan semestinya menyebabkan ancaman kepada keselamatan negara atau ketenteraman awam. Perhimpunan dalam kes ini diadakan dalam stadium pada waktu malam yang tidak menjejaskan perjalanan kehidupan seharian atau menghalang lalu lintas. Ia adalah perhimpunan statik dan bukan suatu perarakan atau demonstrasi jalanan.

(4) Sekatan yang dikenakan oleh s. 9(1) dan 9(5) APA adalah tidak munasabah kerana ia membentuk halangan yang berkesan terhadap perhimpunan segera dan spontan. Adalah mustahil bagi penganjur untuk menganjurkan perhimpunan secara spontan tanpa ancaman pendakwaan. Tidak ada peruntukan dalam APA bagi apa-apa pengecualian walaupun keperluan untuk perhimpunan diperlukan dengan segera. Walau bagaimanapun, s. 9(1) secara bersendirian, tanpa kesalahan dan penalti di bawah s. 9(5), tidak mempunyai kesan menghalang perhimpunan yang segera dan secara spontan. Dengan itu, s. 9(5) sepatutnya diasingkan daripada keperluan notis dalam s. 9(1) dan dibatalkan kerana tidak berperlembagaan.

Oleh Hamid Sultan Abu Backer HMR (menyetujui):

(1) Tidak ada langsung peruntukan bagi sesiapa yang berhimpun secara aman dan tanpa senjata untuk dituduh bagi apa-apa kesalahan di bawah APA. Jika perhimpunan itu sendiri adalah aman, maka hukuman jenayah terhadap penganjur tidak akan melayakkannya kepada perlindungan yang dikehendaki, iaitu sebagai mempunyai kaitan langsung atau hampir kepada per. 10(2) Perlembagaan.

(2) APA memberikan hak untuk setiap orang berhimpun sama ada notis diberikan atau tidak. Untuk menjadikan sebagai jenayah kerana tidak memberikan notis dan menghukum penganjur adalah tidak mempunyai kaitan dengan `ketenteraman awam' atau `kepentingan keselamatan Persekutuan' kecuali perhimpunan tersebut tidak aman. Seksyen 9(5) gagal melepasi `ujian munasabah' dan juga `ujian perkadaran' kerana tidak mempunyai kaitan dengan `ketenteraman awam', `keselamatan Persekutuan' dan/atau perhimpunan yang bukan secara aman. Beban adalah pada Negara untuk memuaskan mahkamah bahawa pengenaan sekatan-sekatan adalah bukan hanya demi kepentingan keselamatan Persekutuan atau ketenteraman awam malah memuaskan ujian kemunasabahan dan terangkum ke dalam ruang litup per. 10(2) Perlembagaan.

(3) Perkara 10 tidak menjadikan pelanggaran sekatan sebagai jenayah. Adalah salah untuk membaca per. 10 sebagai menyatakan bahawa jika terdapat pelanggaran sekatan maka perlu ada hukuman jenayah, lebih-lebih lagi apabila sekatan tersebut per se tidak berkait langsung dengan perhimpunan. Sekatan-sekatan tersebut adalah bersifat prosedur dan/atau pertadbiran. Perangka-perangka Perlembagaan tidak memperuntukkan hukuman jenayah atau mewujudkan enakmen untuk hukuman jenayah bagi pelanggaran sekatan-sekatan. Kanun Keseksaan, Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan undang-undang spesifik iaitu mempunyai hukuman jenayah yang mencukupi untuk memastikan `undang-undang dan keamanan', `ketenteraman awam', `keselamatan Persekutuan', `ketenangan awam' dan lain-lain.

(4) Mempertimbangkan ujian tegar berkaitan dengan `sekatan munasabah', notis sepuluh hari bukanlah berlebihan atau melanggar per. 10(2) kerana ia tidak menghalang orang awam daripada berhimpun secara aman dan tanpa senjata pada bila-bila masa, siang atau malam. Notis sepuluh hari yang penganjur perlu berikan tidak berkait langsung dengan per. 10(2). Adalah tidak diperlukan untuk menggunakan jurisprudens `sekatan munasabah' kepada penganjur walaupun ia mungkin dilihat sebagai cara tidak langsung untuk menghalang perhimpunan aman. Walau bagaimanapun, sengatan notis sepuluh hari tidak akan wujud jika hukuman jenayah dikeluarkan dan sekatan atau syarat dijadikan serupa dengan syarat yang dinyatakan dalam s. 6 APA yang tidak mempunyai apa-apa hukuman jenayah.

Case(s) referred to:

Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra (1961) 3 SCR 423 (refd)

Chai Kheng Lung v. Inspector Dzulkarnain Abdul Karim & Anor [2009] 7 CLJ 133 (refd)

Chintaman Rao & Anor v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1951 AIR 118 SC (refd)

Dalip Bhagwan Singh v. PP [1997] 4 CLJ 645 FC (refd)

Darma Suria Risman Saleh v. Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2010] 1 CLJ 300 FC (refd)

Dato Menteri Othman Baginda & Anor v. Dato Ombi Syed Alwi Syed Idrus [1984] 1 CLJ 28; 1984 1 CLJ (Rep) 98 FC (refd)

De Freitas v. The Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing and Others [1998] UKPC 30 (refd)

Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v. Nordin Salleh & Anor [1992] 2 CLJ 1125; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 72 SC (refd)

Dr Mohd Nasir Hashim v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia [2007] 1 CLJ 19 CA (refd)

Hubbard v. Pitt [1976] QB 142 (refd)

Kameshwar Prasad and Ors v. The State of Bihar and Anor 1962 AIR 1166 SC (refd)

Lee Kwan Woh v. PP [2009] 5 CLJ 631 FC (refd)

Muhammad Hilman Idham & Ors v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2011] 9 CLJ 50 CA (foll)

Nik Noorhafizi Nik Ibrahim & Ors v. PP [2014] 2 CLJ 273 CA (refd)

Om Kumar & Ors v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689 (refd)

PP v. Bird Dominic Jude [2013] 8 CLJ 471 CA (refd)

PP v. Cheah Beng Poh, Louis & Ors & Anor [1984] 1 CLJ 117; [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 383 HC (refd)

PP v. Karpal Singh Ram Singh [2012] 5 CLJ 580 CA (refd)

PP v. Kok Wah Kuan [2007] 6 CLJ 341 FC (refd)

PP v. Pung Chen Choon [1994] 1 LNS 208 SC (refd)

R v. Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (refd)

R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 (refd)

Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice SR Tendolkar and Ors 1958 AIR 538 SC (refd)

Re Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt.4/5.06.2011 v. Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors (refd)

RMD Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India 1957 AIR 628 SC (refd)

Shamim Reza Abdul Samad v. PP [2009] 6 CLJ 93 FC (refd)

Siva Segara Kanapathi Pillay v. PP [1984] 2 CLJ 95; [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 353 FC (refd)

Sivakumar v. State of Tamilnadu [2013] 7 MLJ 395 (refd)

Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 3 CLJ 507 FC (refd)

State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and Ors [2005] 8 SCC 534 (refd)

The Government of the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya And Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] 1 LNS 145 HC (refd)

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 (refd)

Yong Kar Mun v. PP [2013] 5 CLJ 751 CA (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Federal Constitution, arts. 4(2)(b), 10(1)(b), (2)(a), (b), (c), 67, 111, 112, 127, 135, 149, 151

Legal Profession Act 1976, s. 46A(1)

Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, ss. 2, 6, 7, 8, 9(1), (5), 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20(1), 21(1), 23

Penal Code, ss. 141, 142, 145

Police Act 1967, s. 27(5)(a), 27C

Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, s. 15(5)(a), (7)

Assembly Law [Ger], s. 14.1

Constitution of India [Ind], art. 19

Code of Criminal Procedure [Ind], s. 144

Public Order Act 1986 [UK], s. 11(1)

Counsel:

For the appellant - N Surendran (Latheefa Koya, Syahredzan Johan & Melissa Sasidaran with him); M/s Daim & Gamany

For the respondent - Wan Shaharuddin Wan Ladin (Mohd Fairuz Johari with him); DPPs

[Appeal from High Court, Shah Alam; Criminal Appeal No: 44(A)-75-08-2013]

Reported by Ashok Kumar




PROSEDUR SIVIL: Bidangkuasa - Mahkamah Sesyen - Tuntutan balas defendan - Jumlah yang dituntut - Sama ada di luar bidangkuasa Mahkamah Sesyen

KETERANGAN: Anggapan bertentangan - Akta Keterangan 1950, s. 114(g) - Kegagalan memanggil saksi material - Sama ada anggapan bertentangan terpakai


TAN TEE SENG lwn. TINJAU PERMAI SDN BHD [2014] 1 SMC 123
MAHKAMAH SESYEN, TEMERLOH
SITI AMINAH GHAZALI HS
[SAMAN NO: 52-150-2010]
12 JUN 2012

Defendan telah memfailkan tuntutan balas terhadap plaintif untuk jumlah sebanyak RM251,696.03 kerana log purchase bills (`dokumen sokongan') yang dikemukakan oleh plaintiff dipalsukan. Oleh itu, defendan menegaskan bahawa jumlah yang dituntut oleh plaintif adalah sebenarnya jumlah yang perlu dibayar oleh plaintif kepada defendan. Bagi membuktikan tuntutan balas terhadap plaintif, defendan telah mengemukakan seramai dua orang saksi, iaitu, Encik Tang Meng Cheah (`SD1') dan Puan Gan Boon Siew (`SD2'). SD1 yang merupakan pengurus kumpulan syarikat defendan, telah menjelaskan kepada mahkamah berdasarkan kepakarannya berkenaan ciri-ciri yang menunjukkan dokumen sokongan plaintif adalah dokumen palsu dan sengaja diada-adakan. Defendan gagal mengemukakan saksi material atau laporan kimia untuk menyokong dakwaan defendan bahawa dokumen sokongan tersebut sememangnya telah dipalsukan. Defendan juga telah membuat tuntutan tambahan sebanyak RM131,086.10 yang dikatakan sebagai nilai kayu bergergaji yang telah diambil secara salah oleh plaintif tetapi tidak diplidkan oleh defendan. Antara isu-isu yang dibangkitkan untuk pertimbangan adalah: (i) sama ada keterangan dan analisa pakar kimia yang dijalankan oleh SD1 boleh diterima; (ii) sama ada anggapan bertentangan di bawah s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai; dan (iii) sama ada tuntutan balas di luar bidangkuasa Mahkamah Sesyen.

Diputuskan (menolak tuntutan balas defendan dengan kos):

(1) Keterangan dan analisa yang dibuat oleh SD1 tidak boleh diterimapakai sebulat-bulatnya oleh mahkamah tanpa sebarang keterangan atau bukti sokongan. Tiada sebarang usaha dilakukan oleh pihak defendan untuk merujuk dokumen-dokumen yang dikatakan telah dipalsukan kepada pihak Jabatan Kimia. (perenggan 12)

(2) Alegasi pemalsuan perlu dibuktikan dengan kukuh. Adalah merupakan prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa beban pembuktian adalah di atas bahu pihak defendan seperti diperuntukkan di bawah s. 101 Akta Keterangan 1950. Mahkamah telah menggunapakai peruntukkan s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 atas kegagalan defendan untuk mengemukakan saksi material. (perenggan 13 & 16)

(3) Oleh kerana jumlah RM131,086.10 tidak dinyatakan di dalam pliding defendan, maka mahkamah tidak mempertimbangkan tuntutan tersebut. Jumlah yang diplidkan dalam pernyataan tuntutan balas adalah RM251,696.03. Berdasarkan peruntukan s. 65(1) Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948, tuntutan balas defendan adalah di luar bidangkuasa Mahkamah Sesyen. (perenggan 10, 17 & 18)

Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Time Online Dotcom Bhd v. Bates (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2005] 6 CLJ 389 HC (dirujuk)

Perundangan yang dirujuk:

Evidence Act 1950, ss. 101, 114(g)

Subordinate Courts Act 1948, ss. 65(1), 66(1)

Kaunsel:

Bagi pihak plaintif - T/n Wan Balbir & Assocs

Bagi pihak defendan - T/n Andrew David Wong & Ong

Dilaporkan oleh Sandra Gabriel

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