CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Interference by appellate court - Whether trial judge had dealt with all issues raised - Uncertainty in grounds of decision of Court of Appeal - Whether Court of Appeal applied correct principle of appellate interference - Whether appellate interference warranted
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Amendment - Appellate stage - Amendment to counterclaim - Court of Appeal allowed amendment rejected by High Court - Whether High Court dealt in sufficient depth in rejection of amendment - Whether High Court delivered correct decision on amendment - Whether Court of Appeal right in reversing decision of High Court on amendment
JURISDICTION: Court of Appeal - Appellate interference - Test for - Whether broadened to include issues stated in broad and general grounds - Whether error allegedly committed by trial judge identified - Whether trial judge plainly wrong - Whether appellate interference warranted
CONLAY CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD v. PEREMBUN (M) SDN BHD
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
ZULKEFLI MAKINUDIN CJ (MALAYA); RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK); HASHIM YUSOFF FCJ; AHMAD MAAROP FCJ; ZAINUN ALI FCJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 02(f)-63-09-2012(W)]
17 OCTOBER 2013
This was the appellant/plaintiff's appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal in reversing the decision of the High Court granted in favour of the plaintiff. The claim in the High Court was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, inter alia, for (i) the value of work done under the initial sub-contract; (ii) variation works; and (iii) for the return of the sum paid on the performance bond pursuant to a demand made by the defendant. The defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiff for the alleged delay, cost of rectification and defective works. The High Court decided in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant thus appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. However, there was no pronouncement by the Court of Appeal as to whether the matter was to be remitted to the High Court for a retrial and neither was there any pronouncement made that the plaintiff's claim was to stand dismissed. There was also no pronouncement on the defendant's counterclaim. Upon the plaintiff's application, leave was granted by the Federal Court on the questions, inter alia, (i) whether the test for the appellate interference had been broadened to include the ground that the issues for trial had been stated in very broad and general grounds; (ii) whether it was correct to set aside an order of the High Court after a full trial on these grounds without identifying the error, if any, that the trial judge was said to have committed in adjudicating the issue; (iii) whether the test for allowing an amendment to the pleadings that was made after evidence had been fully adduced had been liberalised to allow the amendment for so long as an order for costs was sufficient to compensate, and if the Court of Appeal was to hold that the trial judge ought to have allowed the amendment, then, whether the dispute ought not then be remitted to the High Court for a retrial.
Held (allowing appeal with costs; setting aside order of Court of Appeal and restoring order of High Court)
Per Zulkefli Makinudin CJ (Malaya) delivering the judgment of the court:
(1) The case before the High Court was one that involved findings of facts and there was no cause for the Court of Appeal to have intervened to set aside the decision of the High Court in the circumstances of the case. Unless it was found that the learned trial judge was plainly wrong, it was not open for the Court of Appeal to have intervened even to the limited extent of ordering retrial. (para 10)
(2) The learned trial judge had dealt with the issues raised by the defendant, inter alia, on the issue of variation works, counterclaim and defective works. Having noted that the learned trial judge had gone through all evidence, both oral and documentary, and had given reasons for such findings which the Court of Appeal was not in a position to controvert, the Court of Appeal was wrong in exercising its powers of appellate interference. More so, when the Court of Appeal was found uncertain in its grounds of judgment for its decision whether to order a retrial of the case or not. Clearly, the Court of Appeal, in revising the decision of the High Court, had not correctly applied the principle of appellate interference. (paras 12-15)
(3) The Court of Appeal, in their judgment, had allowed the application by the defendant to amend the counterclaim which the learned trial judge had rejected. The learned trial judge had dealt in sufficient depth in this matter and had delivered the correct decision insofar as the amendments were concerned. The learned trial judge was mindful of the fact that this was an amendment that was made late in the day after the witnesses had been called to give evidence and tested by cross-examination and the parties had closed their case. In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal was wrong in reversing the decision of the learned trial judge on the issue of amendment. (paras 16, 17 & 18)
(4) Even if the learned trial judge was wrong in refusing the amendment, the Court of Appeal ought then to have proceeded to consider the appeal on its merits with the benefits of the amendment which the Court of Appeal had failed to do. Hence, the learned trial judge was correct in so far as the merits of the case were concerned in refusing the defendant's application for amendment. (para 18)
Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes
Ini adalah rayuan perayu/plaintif terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam mengakas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang diberikan memihak kepada plaintif. Tuntutan di Mahkamah Tinggi dibawa oleh plaintif terhadap defendan, antara lain, untuk (i) nilai kerja yang dilakukan di bawah subkontrak awal; (ii) kerja-kerja perubahan; dan (iii) bagi pemulangan jumlah yang dibayar atas bon pelaksanaan berikutan tuntutan yang dibuat oleh defendan. Defendan menuntut balas terhadap plaintif bagi kelewatan, kos pembaikan dan kerja-kerja yang cacat. Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan memihak kepada plaintif. Defendan, dengan itu, merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan membenarkan rayuan perayu dan mengenepikan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada keputusan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan sama ada perkara tersebut perlu dikembalikan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perbicaraan semula dan tiada keputusan diberikan bahawa tuntutan plaintif kekal ditolak. Juga, tiada keputusan dibuat terhadap tuntutan balas defendan. Atas permohonan plaintif, kebenaran diberikan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan atas persoalan, antara lain: (i) sama ada ujian untuk campur tangan rayuan telah diperluaskan lagi untuk memasukkan alasan bahawa isu-isu untuk perbicaraan dinyatakan dengan alasan luas dan umum; (ii) sama ada adalah betul untuk mengenepikan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi selepas perbicaraan penuh atas alasan-alasan ini tanpa mengenalpasti kekhilafan, jika ada, bahawa hakim bicara dikatakan telah lakukan dalam memutuskan isu tersebut; (iii) sama ada ujian untuk membenarkan pindaan kepada pliding yang dibuat selepas keterangan dikemukakan keseluruhannya telah diliberalisasikan untuk membenarkan pindaan yang boleh dipampas dengan perintah untuk kos, dan jika Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa hakim bicara wajar membenarkan pindaan, maka, sama ada pertikaian tersebut mesti dikembalikan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perbicaraan semula.
Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan dengan kos; mengenepikan perintah Mahkamah Rayuan dan mengembalikan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi)
Oleh Zulkefli Makinudin HB (Malaya) menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:
(1) Kes di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi adalah suatu yang melibatkan dapatan fakta dan tiada kausa untuk Mahkamah Rayuan campur tangan untuk mengenepikan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut dalam keadaan kes. Kecuali didapati bahawa yang arif hakim bicara jelas terkhilaf, Mahkamah Rayuan tidak boleh campur tangan walaupun setakat yang terhad untuk memerintahkan perbicaraan semula.
(2) Yang arif hakim bicara telah mempertimbangkan isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh defendan, antara lain, mengenai isu perubahan kerja-kerja, tuntutan balas dan kerja-kerja yang cacat. Setelah meneliti bahawa yang arif hakim bicara telah mempertimbangkan kesemua keterangan, lisan dan dokumentari, dan telah memberikan alasan-alasan untuk dapatan tersebut yang Mahkamah Rayuan tidak boleh pertikaikan, Mahkamah Rayuan khilaf dalam melaksanakan kuasa-kuasa campur tangan rayuan. Lebih-lebih lagi, apabila Mahkamah Rayuan didapati tidak pasti dalam alasannya mengenai penghakiman keputusannya sama ada untuk memerintahkan perbicaraan kes tersebut atau tidak. Jelas, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam mengakas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tidak mengguna pakai, prinsip campur tangan rayuan, dengan betul.
(3) Mahkamah Rayuan, dalam penghakimannya, telah membenarkan permohonan defendan untuk meminda tuntutan balas yang mana telah ditolak oleh yang arif hakim bicara. Yang arif hakim bicara telah mempertimbangkan secara mendalam perkara ini dan telah memberikan keputusan yang betul setakat mana melibatkan pindaan tersebut. Yang arif hakim menyedari fakta bahawa ini adalah pindaan yang dibuat terlalu lewat selepas saksi-saksi telah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan dan diuji melalui pemeriksaan balas dan pihak-pihak telah menutup kes mereka. Dalam keadaan tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan terkhilaf dalam mengakas keputusan yang arif hakim bicara atas isu pindaan.
(4) Walaupun yang arif hakim bicara khilaf dalam menolak pindaan, Mahkamah Rayuan sepatutnya meneruskan untuk mempertimbangkan rayuan atas merit dengan faedah pindaan tersebut yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan gagal berbuat demikian. Maka, yang arif hakim bicara adalah betul setakat yang melibatkan merit kes dalam menolak permohonan defendan untuk pindaan.
Case(s) referred to:
Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 FC (refd)
Ketteman & Ors v. Hansel Properties Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 38 (refd)
Raphael Pura v. Insas Bhd & Anor [2000] 4 CLJ 830 CA (refd)
Sykt Ying Mui Sdn Bhd v. Muthusamy Sellapan & Other Appeals [1999] 4 CLJ 651 HC (refd)
Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v. Yamaha (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 CLJ 191; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 428 FC (refd)
Counsel:
For the appellant - Robert Lazar (Felix Dorairaj & Aarthi Jeyarajah with him); M/s Dorairaj Low & Teh
For the respondent - Ramdas Tikamdas (N Devian with him); M/s Devan & Assocs
[Appeal from Court of Appeal; Civil Appeal No: W-02-2155-2010]
Reported by S Barathi
CRIMINAL LAW: Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958 - Section 6(1) - Possession of offensive weapon - Sentence passed by court - Consideration of - Whether words "shall be liable" in s. 6(1) gives court inclusive judicial discretion to impose either alternative or cumulative punishment - Whether accused pleaded guilty and was a first offender
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence - Possession of offensive weapon - Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958, s. 6(1) - Whether words "shall be liable" in s. 6(1) gives court inclusive judicial discretion to impose either alternative or cumulative punishment - Whether accused pleaded guilty and was a first offender
WORDS & PHRASES: "shall be liable" - Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958, s. 6(1) - Whether court has inclusive judicial discretion to impose either alternative or cumulative punishment - Jayanthan v. PP
PP v. MUHAMAD HASIF FITRI ABDUL HAMID & ANOR [2013] 2 SMC 120 
MAGISTRATE'S COURT, SERI MANJUNG
NURUL ASYIFA REDZUAN MG
[CASE NO: MMSM(T) 83-148-02-2013]
30 APRIL 2013
Both accused persons were charged under s. 6(1) of the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958 (`the Act'). On 15 February 2013, a police officer together with his patrol team were tracing two Malay men who escaped after attempting to rob a shop. When the police arrived at the vicinity of the shop, they stopped both the accused who were riding on a motorcycle and found a "parang" which had dropped from the first accused's jacket. The second accused, who tried to escape, was finally arrested by the police. Both accused had pleaded guilty to the charge preferred against them.
Held (sentencing first accused to a fine of RM3,000 in default six months' imprisonment; sentencing second accused to six months' imprisonment):
(1) The presence of the words "shall be liable" in s. 6(1) of the Act gives the court an inclusive judicial discretion to impose either alternative or cumulative punishment. The sentence passed by this court was within the ambit of the punishable section and was not against any judicial principles (Jayanthan v. PP; refd). (paras 7 & 8)
(2) The charge here was for having an offensive weapon in possession at a public place or road without lawful authority. Therefore, it was erroneous for the court to make an assumption that the offensive weapon was possibly used to commit another offence as it was not proved by the prosecution. In passing the sentence, the court took into account: (i) the gravity of the offence (ii) the fact that the accused persons were youths and first offenders; and (iii) the plea of guilty at the instance the charge was read. (para 9)
Case(s) referred to:
Jayanthan v. PP [1973] 1 LNS 56 FC (refd)
PP v. Wahab [1964] 1 LNS 150 HC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958, s. 6(1)
Criminal Procedure Code, s. 294
Prevention of Crime Ordinance 1959, s. 15(4)
Counsel:
For the prosecution - Nurul Wahida Jalaluddin; DPP
For the accused - Dharma; YBGK
Reported by Kumitha Abdul Majid