CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judgment - Setting aside - Delay in filing application within time frame - Failure to obtain enlargement of time - Whether application failed - Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 3 r. 5 & O. 42 r. 13

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Leave to appeal - Appeal to Federal Court - Questions posed for determination - Whether court could refuse to answer questions - Whether requirements under s. 96 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 satisfied - Rules of the Federal Court 1995, r. 106 - Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd & Ors


HONG KWI SEONG v. GANAD MEDIA SDN BHD
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
HASHIM YUSOFF FCJ; SURIYADI HALIM OMAR FCJ; AHMAD MAAROP FCJ; ZALEHA ZAHARI FCJ; JEFFREY TAN FCJ
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 02(I)-98 & 96-12-2012(W)]
8 OCTOBER 2013

The respondent obtained a money judgment against the appellant. However, despite having served the sealed order on the appellant's solicitors, the judgment debt remained unpaid. The appellant did not file an appeal or an application to set aside the judgment. On 12 December 2005, an order was obtained to examine the judgment debtor. When the appellant failed to appear on the given date, the respondent obtained an order for payment of the judgment debt in instalments and the said order was served personally on the appellant. Again, no appeal or application to set aside that payment order was filed. Given the fact that the time to make the payments in the said order had expired, an application was made on 22 August 2007 to amend it. On 9 January 2008, the amended payment order was served on the appellant and no appeal or any application was filed to set it aside. Since the appellant failed to make payments on the due dates, the court granted a committal order and a warrant of committal. On 19 April 2010, the appellant filed two applications vide encls. 129 and 130 to set aside the served amended payment order, the committal order and the warrant of committal. The High Court and the Court of Appeal had respectively dismissed both the enclosures with costs. Hence, these appeals. Leave to appeal was granted and the questions that arose for the court's determination were in relation to (i) the powers of a court to direct payment by instalments of a judgment debt under O. 48 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (`RHC'); and (ii) whether a judgment debt could be enforced by an order of committal.

Held (striking out appeals in limine with costs)

Per Suriyadi Halim Omar FCJ delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) The relevant provision for any setting aside application falls under O. 42 r. 13 of the RHC. A party intending to set aside an order or judgment must make his application and serve it on the party who obtained the order or judgment, within 30 days after receipt of the order or judgment by him. If the application is made outside the 30 days period, unless time is enlarged, the application must fail. (paras 11 & 12)

(2) On the facts, no enlargement of time was ever applied for by the appellant prior to the filing of encls. 129 and 130. A brief scrutiny of the dates of all of the relevant orders and their dates of service showed that the appellant was out of time by at least a year. Despite knowing that encls. 129 and 130 were filed pursuant to O. 42 r. 13 of the RHC, the appellant had disregarded the time factor prescribed to regularise the application. Both the enclosures were thus incompetent since no application was filed to extend time pursuant to O. 3 r. 5 of the RHC prior to filing of those applications. (para 13)

(3) The court was not prevented from refusing to answer the questions for determination on certain legal grounds despite leave having been granted. Since the requirements of s. 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 were not satisfied, exacerbated by the want of extension of time and by the empowerment of r. 106 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, this court was entitled to refrain from answering the leave questions (Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd & Ors (foll); Karya Lagenda Sdn Bhd v. Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd & Anor (foll)). (paras 15 & 18)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Responden telah memperolehi penghakiman kewangan terhadap perayu. Walaupun perintah bermeterai telah disampaikan kepada peguamcara perayu, hutang penghakiman masih belum dibayar. Perayu tidak memfailkan rayuan atau permohonan untuk mengenepikan penghakiman tersebut. Pada 12 Disember 2005, satu perintah telah diperolehi untuk memeriksa penghutang penghakiman. Apabila perayu gagal hadir pada tarikh yang ditetapkan, responden telah memperolehi perintah untuk pembayaran hutang penghakiman melalui ansuran dan perintah tersebut diserahkan secara kediri kepada perayu. Sekali lagi, masih tiada rayuan atau permohonan untuk mengenepikan perintah bayaran difailkan. Memandangkan masa yang diberi untuk membuat bayaran dalam perintah tersebut telah luput, satu permohonan dibuat pada 22 Ogos 2007 untuk memindanya. Pada 9 Januari 2008, perintah bayaran terpinda telah diserahkan kepada perayu dan tiada rayuan atau permohonan dibuat untuk mengenepikannya. Oleh kerana perayu gagal membuat bayaran pada tarikh-tarikh yang ditetapkan, mahkamah telah membenarkan perintah pengkomitan dan waran pengkomitan dikeluarkan. Pada 19 April 2010, perayu memfailkan dua permohonan melalui lampiran-lampiran 129 dan 130 untuk mengenepikan perintah bayaran terpinda, perintah pengkomitan dan waran pengkomitan. Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan telah masing-masing menolak kedua-dua lampiran tersebut dengan kos. Oleh itu, rayuan-rayuan ini. Kebenaran merayu diberikan dan persoalan yang dibangkitkan untuk diputuskan oleh mahkamah adalah berkaitan dengan (i) kuasa mahkamah untuk mengarah bayaran melalui ansuran bagi suatu hutang penghakiman di bawah A. 48 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (`KMT'); dan (ii) sama ada hutang penghakiman boleh dilaksanakan melalui perintah pengkomitan.

Diputuskan (membatalkan rayuan-rayuan in limine dengan kos)

Oleh Suriyadi Halim Omar HMP menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:

(1) Peruntukan berkenaan pengenepian permohonan jatuh di bawah A. 42 k. 13 KMT. Satu-satu pihak yang berniat untuk mengenepikan perintah atau penghakiman perlu membuat permohonan dan menyerahkannya kepada pihak yang telah memperolehi perintah atau penghakiman itu, dalam masa 30 hari selepas menerima perintah atau penghakiman tersebut olehnya. Jika permohonan dibuat luar daripada jangka masa 30 hari, kecuali jika terdapat lanjutan masa, permohonan tersebut akan gagal.

(2) Berdasarkan fakta, tiada lanjutan masa dipohon oleh perayu sebelum memfailkan lampiran-lampiran 129 dan 130. Penelitian atas tarikh-tarikh kesemua perintah berkenaan dan tarikh penyampaiannya menunjukkan bahawa perayu berada luar daripada jangka masa selama satu tahun. Walaupun mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa lampiran-lampiran 129 dan 130 difailkan berikutan A. 42 k. 13 KMT, perayu telah mengabaikan faktor masa yang dinyatakan untuk melaraskan permohonan. Kedua-dua lampiran itu adalah tidak kompeten memandangkan tiada permohonan difailkan untuk melanjutkan masa menurut A. 3 k. 5 KMT sebelum memfailkan permohonan-permohonan tersebut.

(3) Mahkamah tidak dihalang daripada keengganan untuk menjawab soalan-soalan yang perlu diputuskan atas beberapa alasan undang-undang walaupun kebenaran telah diberikan. Memandangkan keperluan-keperluan di bawah s. 96 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 tidak dipatuhi, diburukkan lagi dengan kehendak lanjutan masa dan di bawah kuasa k. 106 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Persekutuan 1995, mahkamah ini layak untuk mengelak daripada menjawab persoalan-persoalan bagi kebenaran merayu. (Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd & Ors (diikuti); Karya Lagenda Sdn Bhd v. Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd & Anor (diikuti)).

Case(s) referred to:

Development & Commercial Bank Ltd v. Dinesh Kumar Jashbhai Nagjibhai & Ors [2002] 3 CLJ 108 HC (refd)

Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari bin Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92 FC (refd)

Karya Lagenda Sdn Bhd v. Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 2 CLJ 1 FC (foll)

Ong Guan Teck & Ors v. Hijjas Kasturi [1982] CLJ 31; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 616 HC (refd)

Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 3 CLJ 349 FC (foll)

Tan Kong Min v. Malaysian Nasional Insurance Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 CLJ 825 FC (refd)

VVDN Sockalingam Chettiar And Two Others v. KRPRS M Somasundaram Chettiar [1940] 1 LNS 114 HC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 96(a)

Rules of Court 2012, O. 48

Rules of the Federal Court 1995, r. 106

Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 3 r. 5, O. 42 r. 13, O. 48

Counsel:

For the appellant - Lambert Rasa-Ratnam (Mong Chung Seng with him); M/s Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill

For the respondent - Sharmala Batumalai (Mabel Nirmala James with her); M/s Hamzah, Sulaiman & Partners

[Editor's note: For the Court of Appeal judgment, please see Hong Kwi Seong v. Ganad Media Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2012] 8 CLJ 667]

Reported by Kumitha Abd Majid




ISLAMIC LAW: Syariah legal profession - Legal practice - Admission of Peguam Syarie - Powers of Majlis Agama Islam - Whether could only admit Muslims as Peguam Syarie - Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993, s. 59(1) & (2) - Peguam Syarie Rules 1993, r. 10

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993, s. 59(1) & (2) - Powers of Majlis Agama Islam to admit Peguam Syarie - Power to admit "any person having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law as Peguam Syarie" in s. 59(1) - Whether subject to and curtailed by s. 59(2) of Act - Whether could only admit persons of the Islamic faith

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: Construction of statutes - Parent and subsidiary legislation - Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 - Peguam Syarie Rules 1993 - Inconsistency - Provision in Rules contrary to intent and purport of provision in parent Act - Whether Rules did not stand on equal footing with parent Act - Whether could not override parent Act - Whether provision in Rules ultra vires

WORDS & PHRASES: "any person" - Section 59(1), Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 - Natural meaning - Whether meaning "any Muslim" - Whether meaning any person regardless of his or her religion


VICTORIA JAYASEELE MARTIN v. MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN & ANOR
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
ABU SAMAH NORDIN JCA; ALIZATUL KHAIR OSMAN JCA; AZIAH ALI JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-01-242-2011]
12 SEPTEMBER 2013
[2013] CLJ JT(6)

The appellant, a non-Muslim advocate and solicitor, had applied to the Peguam Syarie Committee, a body established by the first respondent (`the Majlis') under the Peguam Syarie Rules 1993 (`the Rules'), for admission as a Peguam Syarie. The application, purportedly, was made pursuant to s. 59(1) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (`the Act') which provides that "Subject to sub-s. (2), the Majlis may admit any person having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law as Peguam Syarie". On 9 September 2009, the Committee, and hence the Majlis, refused to process the application on the ground that under r. 10 of the Rules, only Muslims could be admitted as Peguam Syarie. It was not in dispute that r. 10, which was enacted pursuant to the powers granted to the Majlis by s. 59(2) of the Act, provides that "A person may be admitted to be a Peguam Syarie if he is a Muslim ...". Be that as it may, the appellant subsequently moved the High Court to review and quash the decision of the Majlis, arguing that r. 10 is inconsistent with s. 59(1) and ultra vires the Act. The learned judge, having adverted to the provisions, took the view that the Majlis was empowered under s. 59(2) to make rules relating to qualification for admission of persons as Peguam Syarie, including the power to impose a condition such as housed in r. 10 (the applicant must be a Muslim), and in the circumstances, dismissed the judicial review application. The appellant appealed and reiterated the point that under the scheme of s. 59 of the Act, and r. 10 of the Rules, a person's faith or religion has never been a sine qua non for admission as a Peguam Syarie. The respondents retorted that it is a matter of basic pre-requisite that a Peguam Syarie should be a Muslim, as the Syariah Court has no jurisdiction over non-Muslims. They further argued that by virtue of the words "subject to sub-s. (2)" in s. 59(1), s. 59(1) is subservient to s. 59(2) as well as the rules made thereunder. Before the learned justices of appeal, the primary question that called for determination was whether, upon the proper constructions of s. 59(1) and (2) of the Act, and r. 10 of the Rules, the aforesaid impugned condition in r. 10 is ultra vires s. 59(1) of the Act.

Held (allowing appeal; declaring r. 10 ultra vires with no order as to costs)

Per Abu Samah Nordin JCA delivering the judgment of the court:

(1) Section 59(1) does not delimit the power of the Majlis to admit any person as a Peguam Syarie only to Muslims. In the absence of any definition, the words "any person" in s. 59(1), in their natural meaning, must mean any person regardless of his religion. There is nothing in the Act to restrict the meaning of the words "any person" to mean "any Muslim". Thus, under s. 59(1), any person with sufficient knowledge of Islamic law may, at the discretion of the Majlis, be admitted as a Peguam Syarie. (para 14)

(2) Under s. 59(1), even being a Muslim per se is not sufficient to be admitted as a Peguam Syarie. He must be a Muslim with sufficient knowledge of Islamic law. It is not the function of the court to question why s. 59(1) was drafted as such. However, it is naïve to think that any non-Muslim is incapable of acquiring sufficient knowledge of Islamic law. It is common knowledge that Islamic law, as a subject of learning, is not the monopoly of Muslims. (para 14)

(3) The power of the Majlis to admit any person having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law as a Peguam Syarie is conferred by the parent Act itself. The rules made under s. 59(2), on the other hand, are a form of subsidiary legislation. As subsidiary legislation, the rules do not stand on equal footing as the parent Act and cannot override the parent Act. (para 15)

(4) The phrase "subject to subsection (2)" in s. 59(1) of the Act does not make s. 59(1) subservient to s. 59(2), as contended. This is because s. 59(2) itself does not take away or curtail the power of the Majlis to admit "any person having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law" as a Peguam Syarie. Section 59(2) is merely an enabling provision, which the legislature has conferred on the Majlis to make rules to regulate the procedure and qualification for admission of Peguam Syarie. The Majlis cannot, by way of subsidiary legislation, make rules inconsistent with or contrary to s. 59(1). Rule 10, which provides that a person may be admitted as a Peguam Syarie if he is a Muslim, is clearly contrary to s. 59(1) which does not limit the power of the Majlis to admit a person as a Peguam Syarie to Muslims only. It is ultra vires s. 59(1) of the 1993 Act. (para 16)

(5) The amendment to s. 59(1) by Act A931 did not alter the meaning of the words "any person" in s. 59(1) or curtail the power of the Majlis to admit any person having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law as a Peguam Syarie. The amendment in fact widens the power of the Majlis to admit a Peguam Syarie. The word "persons" in the original s. 59(1) had been amended to "any person" in the new s. 59(1). In addition, a new sub-s. (3) was introduced to widen the power of the Majlis by allowing it to exempt any member of the Judicial and Legal Service or any person appointed under s. 3 of the Legal Aid Act 1971 from the provisions of s. 59. This means that this court's view that the words "any person" in s. 59(1) as including any person regardless of his religion is not contrary to the whole scheme of the Act. Simply put, the Act does not close the doors for non-Muslims having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law to appear in Syariah Court. (paras 17 & 20)

(6) The word "Muslim" has not been used consistently throughout the Act as a qualification on matters relating to appointment, admission and membership of a body, committee or council, or appointment of judges of the Syariah Court. In any case, if the intention of s. 59 is to admit only Muslims having sufficient knowledge of Islamic law as Peguam Syarie, it must say so in clear and unequivocal terms. The duty of the court is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with settled rules of construction. The court has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it is called upon to interpret. (paras 21 & 22)

Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Perayu, seorang peguambela dan peguamcara yang bukan beragama Islam, telah memohon kepada Jawatankuasa Peguam Syarie, sebuah badan yang ditubuhkan oleh responden pertama (`Majlis') di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Peguam Syarie 1993 (`Kaedah'), untuk diterima masuk sebagai Peguam Syarie. Permohonan dibuat di bawah s. 59(1) Akta Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993 (`Akta') yang memperuntukkan bahawa "Tertakluk kepada sub-s. (2), Majlis boleh menerima masuk sesiapa yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam sebagai Peguam Syarie". Pada 9 September 2009, Jawatankuasa, dan Majlis, menolak untuk memproses permohonan tersebut atas alasan bahawa di bawah k. 10 Kaedah, hanya mereka yang beragama Islam boleh diterima masuk sebagai Peguam Syarie. Ia tidak dipertikaikan bahawa k. 10, yang telah digubal menurut kuasa yang diberikan kepada Majlis oleh s. 59(2) Akta, memperuntukkan bahawa "Seseorang itu boleh diterima masuk sebagai Peguam Syarie jika beragama Islam ...'' Walau apa pun, perayu seterusnya memohon ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk menyemak semula dan membatalkan keputusan Majlis, dengan hujahan bahawa k. 10 adalah tidak selaras dengan s. 59(1) dan ultra vires Akta tersebut. Yang arif hakim, setelah merujuk kepada peruntukan, mengambil pandangan bahawa Majlis diberikan kuasa di bawah s. 59(2) untuk membuat peraturan-peraturan berhubungan kelayakan kemasukan seseorang sebagai Peguam Syarie, termasuk kuasa untuk mengenakan satu syarat seperti yang terdapat dalam k. 10 (pemohon mesti beragama Islam), dan dalam keadaan itu, telah menolak permohonan semakan kehakiman. Perayu merayu dan mengulangi hujahan bahawa di bawah s. 59 Akta, dan k. 10 Kaedah, kepercayaan atau agama seseorang tidak pernah menjadi satu sine qua non untuk kemasukan sebagai Peguam Syarie. Pihak responden membalas bahawa ia adalah satu perkara pra-asas bahawa Peguam Syarie harus beragama Islam, kerana Mahkamah Syariah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa atas orang bukan Islam. Mereka juga berhujah bahawa berdasarkan perkataan "tertakluk kepada sub-s. (2)" di bawah s. 59(1), s. 59(1) adalah akur pada s. 59(2) serta peraturan-peraturan yang telah dibuat. Di hadapan yang arif hakim-hakim, soalan utama yang memerlukan penentuan adalah sama ada, berdasarkan pentafsiran betul s. 59(1) dan (2) Akta, serta k. 10 Kaedah, syarat yang dipersoalkan dalam k. 10 adalah ultra vires s. 59(1) Akta.

Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan; mengisytiharkan k. 10 ultra vires tanpa perintah untuk kos)

Oleh Abu Samah Nordin HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:

(1) Seksyen 59(1) tidak membatasi kuasa Majlis untuk menerima masuk sesiapa sebagai Peguam Syarie hanya kepada mereka yang beragama Islam. Tanpa sebarang definisi, perkataan "any person" dalam s. 59(1), mengikut maksud biasa, mesti bermaksud sesiapa sahaja tanpa mengira agama. Tiada apa-apa dalam Akta yang menyekat makna perkataan "any person" untuk bermaksud "sesiapa yang beragama Islam". Oleh itu, di bawah s. 59(1), sesiapa yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam boleh, pada budibicara Majlis, diterima masuk sebagai Peguam Syarie.

(2) Di bawah s. 59(1), walaupun seseorang itu beragama Islam dengan sendirinya, adalah tidak memadai untuk diterima masuk sebagai Peguam Syarie. Seseorang itu harus beragama Islam dengan pengetahuan undang-undang Islam yang mencukupi. Ia bukan fungsi mahkamah untuk mempersoalkan mengapa s. 59(1) telah dirangkakan sebegitu. Walau bagaimanapun, ia adalah naïf untuk berfikir bahawa seseorang yang bukan beragama Islam tidak berupaya untuk memperoleh pengetahuan yang mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam. Ia adalah pengetahuan umum bahawa undang-undang Islam, sebagai satu subjek pembelajaran, bukan monopoli orang-orang Islam.

(3) Kuasa Majlis untuk menerima masuk seseorang yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam sebagai Peguam Syarie diberikan oleh Akta induknya. Peraturan-peraturan yang dibuat di bawah s. 59(2), walau bagaimanapun, adalah satu bentuk perundangan subsidiari. Sebagai perundangan subsidiari, peraturan-peraturan itu tidak berdiri di tempat yang seimbang dengan Akta induk dan tidak boleh mengatasi Akta induk.

(4) Frasa "tertakluk kepada subseksyen (2)" dalam s. 59(1) Akta tidak membuatkan s. 59(1) akur kepada s. 59(2), seperti yang dihujahkan. Ini adalah kerana s. 59(2) secara sendirinya tidak mengambil atau mengurangkan kuasa Majlis untuk menerima masuk "sesiapa yang mempunyai pengetahuan mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam" sebagai Peguam Syarie. Seksyen 59(2) hanyalah satu peruntukan yang berkebolehan, di mana badan perundangan telah mengurniakan ke atas Majlis untuk menyediakan peraturan-peraturan supaya dapat mengawal selia tatacara dan kelayakan untuk kemasukan Peguam Syarie. Majlis tidak boleh, melalui perundangan subsidiari, membuat peraturan-peraturan yang tidak selaras atau bertentangan dengan s. 59(1). Kaedah 10, yang memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang boleh diterima masuk sebagai Peguam Syarie jika beliau beragama Islam, adalah dengan jelasnya bertentangan dengan s. 59(1) yang tidak menghadkan kuasa Majlis untuk menerima masuk hanya seseorang yang beragama Islam sebagai Peguam Syarie. Ia adalah ultra vires s. 59(1) Akta 1993.

(5) Pindaan pada s. 59(1) Akta oleh A931 tidak mengubah maksud perkataan "any person" dalam s. 59(1) atau mengurangkan kuasa Majlis untuk menerima masuk sesiapa yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam sebagai Peguam Syarie. Malah, pindaan meluaskan kuasa Majlis untuk menerima masuk Peguam Syarie. Perkataan "persons" dalam s. 59(1) yang asal telah dipinda ke "any person" dalam s. 59(1) yang baru. Tambahan, sub-s. (3) telah diperkenalkan untuk meluaskan kuasa Majlis dengan membenarkan Majlis untuk mengecualikan mana-mana ahli Khidmat Guaman dan Kehakiman atau sesiapa sahaja yang dilantik di bawah s. 3 Akta Bantuan Guaman 1971 daripada peruntukan s. 59. Ini bermakna bahawa pandangan mahkamah ini berkenaan perkataan "any person" dalam s. 59(1) sebagai termasuk sesiapa sahaja tidak kira agama, adalah tidak bertentangan dengan keseluruhan skim Akta. Secara ringkas, Akta tidak akan menghalang sesiapa yang bukan beragama Islam yang mempunyai pengetahuan undang-undang Islam yang mencukupi untuk berbicara di Mahkamah Syariah.

(6) Perkataan "Muslim" tidak digunakan secara konsisten dalam Akta sebagai kelayakan berkenaan perkara-perkara berhubungan perlantikan, kemasukan dan keahlian badan, jawatankuasa atau majlis, atau perlantikan hakim-hakim Mahkamah Syariah. Walau bagaimanapun, jika niat s. 59 adalah untuk menerima masuk hanya orang Islam yang mempunyai pengetahuan yang mencukupi berkenaan undang-undang Islam sebagai Peguam Syarie, ia harus dinyatakan dengan jelas dan terang. Tanggungjawab mahkamah adalah untuk memperjelaskan bahasa Akta sejajar dengan peraturan-peraturan pentafsiran yang ditetapkan. Mahkamah tiada kena-mengena dengan dasar mana-mana Akta yang diseru untuk ditafsirkan.

Case(s) referred to:

Becke v. Smith [1936] 2 M&W 191 (refd)

Capper v. Baldwin [1965] 2 QB 53 (refd)

NKM Holding Sdn Bhd v. Pan Malaysia Wood Bhd [1986] 1 LNS 79 SC (refd)

R v. Banbury (inhabitants) 1834 1 Ad & El 136 (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993, ss. 10, 32, 41(2)(b)(ii), 42, 43(2)(b)(ii), 59(1), (2), (3)

Federal Constitution, arts. 5, 10(1)(c)

Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 2, 17A

Legal Aid Act 1971, s. 3

Peguam Syarie Rules 1993, rr. 3, 7, 10

Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 53

Counsel:

For the appellant - Ranjit Singh (Jamie Wong with him); M/s Ranjit Singh & Yeoh

For the 1st respondent - Sulaiman Abdullah (Zulkifly Che Yong & Nur Elyani Noorkhuszairy with him); M/s Zulkifli Yong Azmi & Co

For the 2nd respondent - Arik Sanusi Yeop Johari (Norhisham Ismail with him); AG's Chambers

[Editor's note: For the High Court judgment, please see Victoria Jayaseele Martin v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor [2011] 7 CLJ 233.]

Reported by Wan Sharif Ahmad




CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary judgment - Triable issues - Whether established - Whether plaintiff's claim statute barred - Whether premature to determine issues raised - Whether full details of claim provided - Whether further examination required - Whether court could decide matter summarily - Rules of Court 2012, O. 14


COLOUR SHIELD SDN BHD v. TECH ENGINEERING SDN BHD [2013] 2 SMC 1
SESSIONS COURT, MIRI
AWANG KERISNADA SJ
[CASE NO: 52-274-7-2012]
5 JUNE 2013

Vide encl. 6, the plaintiff filed an application for summary judgment against the defendant. The plaintiff's claim was premised on the fact that the defendant did not pay the plaintiff for the works done by the latter which involved, inter alia, "Project: Exxon-Mobile" and "Project: Bintulu". The defendant denied that the documents exhibited by the plaintiff were the defendant's documents and argued that the payments made were for other projects which were not the subject of the litigation herein. Further, by invoking s. 20(1) of the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's claim was statute barred.

Held (dismissing plaintiff's application with costs)

(1) Order 14 r. 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that a defendant can show cause against an O. 14 application for summary judgment by way of affidavit. Further, in a summary judgment, the principles of law to be applied are straight and simple (Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors; refd). (paras 3 & 7)

(2) The plaintiff failed to exhibit any official receipts that the payments made were for the subject projects of the present litigation. In other words, these payments were not and could not be linked to the present claim in this suit. (para 5)

(3) There was no running account as the subject projects were all individual and distinct. The plaintiff had not exhibited any such affidavit evidence nor put forth any documentary exhibits in their affidavits to prove that there was such a running account. Since this was just a summary judgment application, the full evidence on this matter had not been adduced yet. (paras 6 & 9)

(4) It would be premature to determine, at this summary judgment stage, whether the plaintiff's claim was statute barred or not. The issues on limitation were matters which required further examination on when payments were made by the defendant and whether those payments had proved that limitation of time for the plaintiff's claim had set in or not. The question on limitation was triable as it involved the determination of when the cause of action actually started or began. Hence, this was a matter which the court could not decide summarily as the facts and the merits of the case had to be looked at accordingly. (paras 10 & 12)

Case(s) referred to:

Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ 627; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 14 SC (refd)

Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 609 CA (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Rules of Court 2012, O. 14 r. 4

Sarawak Limitation Ordinance, s. 20(1)

Kaunsel:

For the plaintiff - Merlyn Toh; M/s Yii & Co

For the defendant - Gabriel Kok; M/s Khoo & Co

Reported by Kumitha Abd Majid