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Issue #16/2020
09 April 2020
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New This Week
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THE SPEAKER OF DEWAN UNDANGAN NEGERI OF SARAWAK
DATUK AMAR MOHAMAD ASFIA AWANG NASSAR v.
TING TIONG CHOON & ORS AND OTHER APPEALS [2020] 3 CLJ 757
FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT CJ; ROHANA YUSUF PCA; DAVID WONG DAK WAH CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK); MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH FCJ; NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ; VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ; ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ; ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ; HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
[CIVIL APPEALS NO: 01(f)-20-08-2019(Q), 01(f)-21-08-2019(Q) & 02(f)-65-08-2019(Q)]
11 FEBRUARY 2020
The decision of the Sarawak State Legislative Assembly ('the House') in disqualifying vide a Ministerial Motion a member of the House after the latter has committed an act of disqualification of acquiring a citizenship of a country other than Malaysia, but has since renounced it prior to his election to the House, upon the proper construction of arts. 17(1) and 19(1) of the Sarawak Constitution, arts. 72 and 118 of the Federal Constitution and s. 32(e) of the Election Offences Act 1954, is legal, lawful and constitutional.
Art. 17(1) is plain in that a person who is otherwise eligible for election to the House but who has since become disqualified for having committed an act of disqualification under art. 17(1)(g), as was the case here, loses his eligibility to stand for election to the House, and by extension must also lose his eligibility to be appointed to the House as an elected member. Also, the disqualifying act as was incurred by the member, having been caught by art. 17(1)(g), is not removable, redeemable or forgivable; it cannot be removed or ceased in the absence of any provision to that effect in art. 17(3) of the State Constitution. Further, under art. 19(1), the House is clearly clothed with the jurisdiction to raise the issue of the continued membership of an elected member, or to disqualify a member and remove him from the House. Reading art. 19(1) together with art. 72 of the Federal Constitution, such a decision of the House is clearly not justiciable in law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislature - State Assembly - Assemblyman voluntarily acquired Australian citizenship - Assemblyman renounced citizenship after five years and nominated as candidate for State Constituency - Returned as winner - Ministerial motion moved at Legislative Assembly of State of Sarawak ('Dewan') to disqualify Assemblyman - Whether Assemblyman disqualified for election to Dewan for voluntarily acquiring foreign citizenship - Whether disqualification removed or ceased to have effect - Whether disqualification removed merely by renouncing foreign citizenship - Whether Dewan clothed with jurisdiction to disqualify and remove Assemblyman - Whether there was conflict between art. 118 of Federal Constitution and art. 19(1) of State Constitution of Sarawak - Whether Dewan infringed doctrine of separation of powers - Whether court could question validity of decision taken by Dewan - State Constitution of Sarawak, art. 17(1)(g)
COMPTROLLER OF STATE SALES TAX, SARAWAK & ANOR v.
PETROLIAM NASIONAL BHD (PETRONAS) [2020] 3 CLJ 858
HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK, KUCHING
CHRISTOPHER CHIN SOO YIN JC
[SUIT NO: KCH-21NCVC-10-11-2019 (HC2)]
23 JANUARY 2020
An application to recuse a Judicial Commissioner from hearing a suit, and to have it instead heard by a High Court Judge upon the supposition that the Judicial Commissioner may suffer from perceived bias because of the temporary nature of his tenure, or because he could be beholden to the Prime Minister since his appointment and confirmation is allegedly dependent on the latter, is frivolous and devoid of merits, and an affront to the Judiciary. The grounds posited cannot hold water because many Judicial Commissioners have delivered decisions against the Executive and the Government of the day, and further, Judges and Judicial Commissioners, by virtue of their oath of office, ought to be deemed to be able to administer justice without fear or favour, and to apply the law as they understood it free from any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judge - Recusal - Recusal of Judicial Commissioner ('JC') - Allegation that JC's decision may favour Prime Minister to earn confirmation as High Court Judge - Whether allegation tenable - Whether there was real danger of biasness - Whether JC should recuse himself
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Babar Ali (W/N Pakistan) v. PP [2020] 1 LNS 10 (CA) affirming the High Court case of PP v. Babar Ali [Criminal Trial No: 45A - 12- 01/2015]
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Sithradevi A/P Nagalingam v. Masdar Darman & Anor; Majlis Peguam Malaysia (Intervener) [2020] 1 LNS 20 (CA) affirming the High Court case of Sithradevi A/P Nagalingam v. Masdar Darman & Anor; Majlis Peguam Malaysia (Intervener) [Originating Summons No: 17D-29-06/2014]
Legal Network Series
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MUHAMMAD NAWAWI TEE ABDULLAH lwn. TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA & YANG LAIN Semasa di bawah perintah tahanan, salinan rakaman percakapan bukan merupakan dokumen yang perlu dikemukakan kepada pemohon habeas corpus. Ketiadaan rakaman percakapan pemohon tidak memprejudiskan representasi pemohon di hadapan lembaga penasihat. PENAHANAN PENCEGAHAN: Perintah tahanan - Permohonan writ habeas corpus - Dakwaan kegagalan pegawai penyiasat untuk membekalkan salinan rakaman percakapan pemohon - Sama ada wujud kewajipan di sisi undang-undang untuk membekalkan rakaman percakapan pemohon kepada pemohon - Sama ada ketiadaan rakaman percakapan memprejudiskan representasi pemohon di hadapan lembaga penasihat - Sama ada pemohon telah diberikan peluang membuat representasi yang efektif di hadapan lembaga penasihat - Sama ada prosedur membuat representasi telah dipatuhi
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MUHAMMAD KAMIL ABDULLAH & SATU LAGI lwn. PP Jagaan dan kawalan perlu dibuktikan melalui keterangan terus bagi kesalahan pengedaran dadah berbahaya. Pengetahuan boleh dibuktikan dengan menggunakan anggapan undang-undang di bawah s. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 atau dari keterangan ikut keadaan. UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Dadah berbahaya - Pengedaran - Jagaan dan kawalan - Niat bersama - Dadah dijumpai di atas lantai di dalam sebuah bilik yang tidak berkunci - Sama ada bilik boleh diakses oleh orang lain selain tertuduh - Sama ada kegagalan pihak polis untuk menyiasat mengenai pihak ketiga adalah memudaratkan kes pendakwaan - Sama ada tertuduh merupakan 'innocent bystander' - Sama ada jagaan dan kawalan telah dibuktikan secara terus
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BEAUTY LAND ENTERPRISE v. MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN, MALAYSIA & ANOR As the 2nd respondent was not an employee of the applicant at the time of dismissal, there cannot be any dismissal of the 2nd respondent by the applicant. The proper employer of the 2nd respondent, which is Sistem Tunggal Sdn Bhd, was not before the Industrial Court. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Application to quash the decision of the Industrial Court that awarded backwages and compensation to the 2nd respondent - Unfair dismissal - Whether the 2nd respondent was an employee of the applicant at the time of dismissal - Whether the decision of the Industrial Court is tainted with errors of law, irrationality and unreasonableness COMPANY LAW: Lifting the corporate veil - Separate entities - Whether the applicant and Sistem Tunggal Sdn Bhd are one single entity - Whether a shareholder of Sistem Tunggal Sdn Bhd who was also a previous owner of the applicant is a common character in both the applicant and Sistem Tunggal Sdn Bhd - Whether there was an element of fraud to warrant lifting the corporate veil
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CEKAL TEGUH SDN BHD v. MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN, MALAYSIA & ORS As the representation by the Minister under s. 20(3) Industrial Relations Act 1967 was unchallenged, the Industrial Court is empowered to determine whether it has wider jurisdiction including extra-territorial jurisdiction. It is in the interest of justice to lift the corporate veil where the 2 companies are being managed as a single entity; one has a high degree of control while the other is merely a vehicle company. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari - Application to quash the decision of the Industrial Court that held that there was constructive dismissal by the applicant - Constructive dismissal - Whether the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute as KML is a foreign company incorporated in Hong Kong - Whether the applicant was the real employer of the Respondents COMPANY LAW: Lifting the corporate veil - Separate entities - Interest of justice - Whether the applicant and KML are one single entity - Whether the applicant was the real employer of the respondents - Degree of control by the applicant - Salaries were paid by the applicant - KML was a vehicle company
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PAN CHEE KEONG v. NUR SUHELMI SUHADI Loss of earning capacity is more appropriate and just where the appellant is still able to work but his earning capacity would be reduced and diminished by reason of his injury. CIVIL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal after full trial - Appeal against general damages and quantum- Assessment of damages - Loss of earning capacity - Loss of future earnings - Appellant had been issued with an "OKU" card - Whether the appellant could return to the same workplace - Whether the appellant could have mitigated his losses by securing another job - Whether loss of earning capacity or loss of future earnings is more appropriate and just
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CLJ 2020 Volume 3 (Part 6)
Within the regimes of our bankruptcy law, the Receiving and Adjudication orders, once rightly made by the court, cannot be annulled on the basis that the same 'ought not to have been made' based on a subsequent change of circumstance or any new argument regarding the debtor's ability to pay his debts. The debtor's solvency as spoken of in s. 6(3) of the Act read with s. 105(1) thereof, must neccessarily relate to the debtor's ability to pay his debts as they become due, namely at the time of the hearing of the creditor's petition and not otherwise; and no consideration, thus, can be given to his ability to pay the debts subsequently, whether based on a change of circumstance, or his new-found solvency and ability to repay same.
Affin Bank Bhd v. Abu Bakar Ismail [2020] 3 CLJ 739 [FC]
BANKRUPTCY: Receiving and adjudication orders - Annulment - Setting aside - Grounds - Whether adjudication and receiving orders correctly made - Whether court may subsequently annul orders on basis of new arguments regarding debtor's ability to pay debts - Whether consideration ought to be given to debtor's ability to pay debts based on subsequent change of circumstances - Whether solvency of debtor must relate to his ability to pay debts as they become due or his ability subsequent to orders made - Whether annulment orders ought to be set aside - Bankruptcy Act 1967, ss. 6(3) & 105(1)
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT CJ
AZAHAR MOHAMED CJ (MALAYA)
DAVID WONG DAK WAH CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK)
ROHANA YUSUF FCJ
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ
- For the appellants - Yoong Sin Min, Sharon Lim Pei Hsien & Sanjiv Naddan; M/s Shook Lin & Bok
- For the respondents - Abu Bakar Ismail; M/s C Leo Camoens
The decision of the Sarawak State Legislative Assembly ('the House') in disqualifying vide a Ministerial Motion a member of the House after the latter has committed an act of disqualification of acquiring a citizenship of a country other than Malaysia, but has since renounced it prior to his election to the House, upon the proper construction of arts. 17(1) and 19(1) of the Sarawak Constitution, arts. 72 and 118 of the Federal Constitution and s. 32(e) of the Election Offences Act 1954, is legal, lawful and constitutional.
Art. 17(1) is plain in that a person who is otherwise eligible for election to the House but who has since become disqualified for having committed an act of disqualification under art. 17(1)(g), as was the case here, loses his eligibility to stand for election to the House, and by extension must also lose his eligibility to be appointed to the House as an elected member. Also, the disqualifying act as was incurred by the member, having been caught by art. 17(1)(g), is not removable, redeemable or forgivable; it cannot be removed or ceased in the absence of any provision to that effect in art. 17(3) of the State Constitution. Further, under art. 19(1), the House is clearly clothed with the jurisdiction to raise the issue of the continued membership of an elected member, or to disqualify a member and remove him from the House. Reading art. 19(1) together with art. 72 of the Federal Constitution, such a decision of the House is clearly not justiciable in law.
The Speaker Of Dewan Undangan Negeri Of Sarawak Datuk Amar Mohamad Asfia Awang Nassar v. Ting Tiong Choon & Ors And Other Appeals [2020] 3 CLJ 757 [FC]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislature - State Assembly - Assemblyman voluntarily acquired Australian citizenship - Assemblyman renounced citizenship after five years and nominated as candidate for State Constituency - Returned as winner - Ministerial motion moved at Legislative Assembly of State of Sarawak ('Dewan') to disqualify Assemblyman - Whether Assemblyman disqualified for election to Dewan for voluntarily acquiring foreign citizenship - Whether disqualification removed or ceased to have effect - Whether disqualification removed merely by renouncing foreign citizenship - Whether Dewan clothed with jurisdiction to disqualify and remove Assemblyman - Whether there was conflict between art. 118 of Federal Constitution and art. 19(1) of State Constitution of Sarawak - Whether Dewan infringed doctrine of separation of powers - Whether court could question validity of decision taken by Dewan - State Constitution of Sarawak, art. 17(1)(g)
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT CJ
ROHANA YUSUF PCA
DAVID WONG DAK WAH CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK)
MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH FCJ
NALLINI PATHMANATHAN FCJ
VERNON ONG LAM KIAT FCJ
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI FCJ
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF FCJ
HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM FCJ
(Civil Appeal No: 01(f)-20-08-2019(Q))
- For the appellant - Cecil Abraham, Shankar Ram Asnani, Rishwant Singh & Russel Lim; M/s Thomas, Shankar Ram & Co Advocs
- For the 1st respondent - Chong Siew Chiang, Wong King Wei & Michael Kong Feng Nian; Messrs King Wei and Company
- For the 2nd respondent - George Lo & Jonathan Tay; M/s George Lo & Partners Advocs
- For the 3rd respondent - Talat Mahmood Abdul Rashid, SAG, Sarawak, Saferi Ali, Mohd Adzrul Adzlan & Evy Liana Atang; SLO, Sarawak
- For the 4th respondent - Shamsul Bolhassan & Azizan Md Arshad; SFCs
(Civil Appeal No: 01(f)-21-08-2019(Q))
- For the appellant - Talat Mahmood Abdul Rashid; SAG, Sarawak, Saferi Ali, Mohd Adzrul Adzlan & Evy Liana Atang; SLO, Sarawak
In a charge of trafficking in dangerous drugs under s. 39B(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, where the offensive drugs were found in a locked room of a house and the key to the room was seized from the accused, lack or absence of exclusivity of the use of the room by the accused per se does not necessarily mean that the accused did not have custody or control of the room or the drugs. In any case, there is nothing in law that requires the prosecution to prove exclusive use of such a room before a conviction under s. 39B(1) can be sustained. If possession need not be exclusive, there is no reason why exclusive use of the room needs to be proved.
Hemankumar Subramaniam v. PP [2020] 3 CLJ 844 [CA]
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous drugs - Presumption - Double presumptions - Trial judge invoked presumption of possession under s. 37(d) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') to invoke presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of DDA - Whether element of possession must be 'found' and not 'deemed' - Whether trial judge erred in invoking double presumptions - Whether accused ought to be acquitted and discharged
CRIMINAL LAW: Dangerous drugs - Possession - Trial judge invoked presumption of possession under s. 37(d) of Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('DDA') to invoke presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of DDA - Whether accused person had complete control and custody of room in which drugs were found - Whether lack of exclusivity of use of room, per se, negated custody or control of room by accused person - Whether knowledge inferred by conduct of accused - Whether possession proved - Whether conviction for trafficking to be substituted with conviction for possession
ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI JCA
ZABARIAH MOHD YUSOF JCA
RHODZARIAH BUJANG JCA
- For the appellant - S Sundarajan; M/s Sundarajan & Assocs
- For the respondent - Samihah Rhazali; DPP
An application to recuse a Judicial Commissioner from hearing a suit, and to have it instead heard by a High Court Judge upon the supposition that the Judicial Commissioner may suffer from perceived bias because of the temporary nature of his tenure, or because he could be beholden to the Prime Minister since his appointment and confirmation is allegedly dependent on the latter, is frivolous and devoid of merits, and an affront to the Judiciary. The grounds posited cannot hold water because many Judicial Commissioners have delivered decisions against the Executive and the Government of the day, and further, Judges and Judicial Commissioners, by virtue of their oath of office, ought to be deemed to be able to administer justice without fear or favour, and to apply the law as they understood it free from any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference.
Comptroller Of State Sales Tax, Sarawak & Anor v. Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) [2020] 3 CLJ 858 [HC]
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Judge - Recusal - Recusal of Judicial Commissioner ('JC') - Allegation that JC's decision may favour Prime Minister to earn confirmation as High Court Judge - Whether allegation tenable - Whether there was real danger of biasness - Whether JC should recuse himself
CHRISTOPHER CHIN SOO YIN JC
- For the plaintiff - Talat Mahmood Abdul Rashid, JC Fong, Nur Azhar Bujang, Saferi Ali & Voon Yan Sin; State Attorney General, Sarawak
- For the defendant - Malik Imtiaz Ahmed Ghulam Sarwar & Alvin Chong; M/s Idris, Alvin Chong & Partners
A public decision maker, such as the State Minerals Management Authority of Sarawak, must give the person affected by its decision an opportunity to be heard, and must also give reasons for its decision. These rights to natural justice are conferred by the common law, and the Authority is bounded to it notwithstanding that the law under which the decision was made does not provide for or mandate such duties. Hence, where the Authority has rejected an application by a holder of a General Prospecting Licence for a mining licence without first hearing the applicant and without giving any reasons for the rejection, its decision is clearly unfair and tainted with procedural impropriety or breach of natural justice, and liable to be quashed.
Gegah Optima Resources Sdn Bhd v. The State Minerals Management Authority, Sarawak & Ors [2020] 3 CLJ 872 [HC]
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Judicial review - Certiorari and mandamus - Application against decision of State Minerals Management Authority ('authority') rejecting application for mining leases - Whether authority empowered to approve or refuse to approve application for mining lease - Whether applicant should be given opportunity to be heard despite no provision under Mineral Ordinance 2004 - Whether right to be heard conferred under common law - Failure to state reason for rejection in letter of refusal - Whether gave rise to inference that relevant fact not considered - Whether decision flawed with procedural impropriety - Whether authority breached rule of natural justice - Whether decision ought to be quashed
AZHAHARI KAMAL RAMLI J
- For the applicant - Andy Tan & Albert Tang; M/s Andy & Assocs
- For the respondents - Azreen Fasya; SLO, Sarawak
An application for enlargement of time under s. 38(4) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 to object to the compensation made by the Land Administrator may only succeed if 'special circumstances' is shown to have existed as would justify the grant of extension. Be that as it may, the Land Administrator, in awarding compensation, must act impartially and must not succumb to considerations irrelevant to the issues at hand. Where the Land Administrator has denied an applicant the opportunity to be heard or shown possible bias or mala fides in making the award, or acted in such ways as to substantially contribute to the applicant's delay in applying for extension, then, enlargement of time ought to be allowed and allowed despite its inordinate delay. Special circumstances were more than proven in the circumstances.
West Coast Expressway Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang [2020] 3 CLJ 885 [HC]
LAND LAW: Land acquisition - Compensation - Objection to sums awarded to landowner and tenants - Application for extension of time to file Borang N - Whether there were special circumstances warranting extension of time - Whether there was clear breach of natural justice - Whether construction of development for public purpose - Land Acquisition Act 1960, s. 38(4), (6) - Rules of Court 2012, O. 92 r. 4
GUNALAN MUNIANDY J
- For the plaintiff - Justin Leong & Samantha Chen; M/s Lee & Koh
- For the defendant - Mohd Abdul Hakim Mohd Ali; State Legal Advisor, Selangor
LNS Article(s)
ONE POLICY TWO COVERS - COMMENTARY ON TIRUMENIYAR AND OTHER RELATED CASES: [Read excerpt]
by G. NAIDU* [2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxTHE FUTURE OF COURTS AND ARBITRATION HEARINGS
AN INTERVIEW WITH TAN SRI DATUK SERI PANGLIMA DAVID WONG DAK WAH THE 5TH CHIEF JUDGE OF SABAH AND SARAWAK (RETIRED ON 20.02.2020) [Read excerpt]
by CRYSTAL WONG WAI CHIN* [2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxiiAN EXAMINATION ON CORRUPTION AND INSECURITY AS POLITICAL SIAMESE TWINS: NIGERIA'S MAJOR SET-BACK [Read excerpt]
by JAMES P. FRIDAY* [2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxi
Principal Acts
| Number | Title | In force from | Repealing |
| ACT 827 | Currency Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | - |
| ACT 826 | Food Donors Protection Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | - |
| ACT 825 | Anti-Fake News (Repeal) Act 2020 | 31 January 2020 | - |
| ACT 824 | Malaysian Health Promotion Board (Dissolution) Act 2019 | 1 April 2020 [PU(B) 119/2020] | - |
| ACT 823 | Finance Act 2019 | Income Tax Act 1967 [Act 53] see s 3, Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 [Act 169] see s 22, Stamp Act 1949 [Act 378] see s 27, Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 [Act 543] see s 29, Sales Tax Act 2018 [Act 806] see s 35, Finance Act 2010 [Act 702] see s 37 and the Finance Act 2018 [Act 812] see s 39 | - |
Amending Acts
| Number | Title | In force from | Principal/Amending Act No |
| ACT A1617 | Franchise (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 590 |
| ACT A1616 | Central Bank of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 701 |
| ACT A1615 | Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Force | ACT 177 |
| ACT A1614 | Labuan Business Activity Tax (Amendment) Act 2020 | 10 February 2020 - para 2(a) and s 13 and 15; Year of assessment 2020 and subsequent years of assessment - para 2(b) and s 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14; 1 January 2019 - s 8 | ACT 445 |
| ACT A1613 | Carriage of Goods by Sea (Amendment) Act 2020 | Not Yet In Foce | ACT 527 |
PU(A)
| Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
| PU(A) 115/2020 | Employees' Social Security (Employees' Social Security (General) Regulations 1971) (Temporary Modification) Regulations 2020 | 6 April 2020 | April 2020 until September 2020 | ACT 4 |
| PU(A) 114/2020 | Employment Insurance System (Employment Insurance System (Registration and Contribution) Regulations 2017) (Temporary Modification) Regulations 2020 | 6 April 2020 | April 2020 until September 2020 | ACT 800 |
| PU(A) 113/2020 | Local Speed Limit (Federal Roads) (West Malaysia) (Amendment) Order 2020 | 3 April 2020 | 8 April 2020 | PU(A) 462/1991 |
| PU(A) 112/2020 | Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (No. 2) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 | 2 April 2020 | 3 April 2020 | PU(A) 109/2020 |
| PU(A) 111/2020 | Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Compounding of Offences) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 | 1 April 2020 | 1 April 2020 | PU(A) 327/1993 |
PU(B)
| Number | Title | Date of Publication | In force from | Principal/ Amending Act No |
| PU(B) 193/2020 | Declaration of Quarantine Stations (No. 8) 2020 | 8 April 2020 | 9 April 2020 | ACT 342 |
| PU(B) 192/2020 | Appointment and Revocation of Appointment of Director General for Control of Padi and Rice | 6 April 2020 | 6 April 2020 | ACT 522 |
| PU(B) 191/2020 | Declaration of Quarantine Stations (No. 7) 2020 | 4 April 2020 | 5 April 2020 | ACT 342 |
| PU(B) 190/2020 | Declaration of Quarantine Stations (No. 6) 2020 | 4 April 2020 | 5 April 2020 | ACT 342 |
| PU(B) 189/2020 | Declaration of Quarantine Stations (No. 5) 2020 | 31 March 2020 | 1 April 2020 | ACT 342 |
Legislation Alert
Updated
| Act/Principal No. | Title | Amended by | In force from | Section amended |
| PU(A) 99/1971 | Employees' Social Security (General) Regulations 1971 | PU(A) 115/2020 | April 2020 until September 2020 | Subregulation 32(1) |
| PU(A) 452/2017 | Employment Insurance System (Registration and Contribution) Regulations 2017 | PU(A) 114/2020 | April 2020 until September 2020 | Subregulation 9(1) |
| PU(A) 109/2020 | Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 | PU(A) 112/2020 | 3 April 2020 | Schedule |
| PU(A) 327/1993 | Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Compounding of Offences) Regulations 1993 | PU(A) 111/2020 | 1 April 2020 | First Schedule |
| PU(A) 93/2020 | Price Control and Anti-Profiteering (Determination of Maximum Price) (No. 2) Order 2020 | PU(A) 107/2020 | 1 April 2020 | Schedule |
Revoked
| Act/Principal No. | Title | Revoked by | In force from |
| PU(A) 309/2009 | Price Control (Fixing of Maximum Price) (No. 2) Order 2009 | PU(A) 93/2020 | 20 March 2020 |
| PU(A) 77/2020 | Ministers of the Federal Government Order 2020 | PU(A) 84/2020 | 1 March 2020 |
| PU(A) 451/1999 | Environmental Quality (Refrigerant Management) Regulations 1999 | PU(A) 79/2020 | 1 June 2020 |
| PU(A) 132/2019 | Ministers of the Federal Government Order 2019 | PU(A) 77/2020 | 24 February 2020 |
| PU(A) 379/2006 | Control of Supplies (Marking of Scheduled Article) Order 2006 | PU(A) 63/2020 | 21 February 2020 |